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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Case of Runzheimer International 
It is estimated that more than fourteen million Americans are 
currently employed in a sales or sales-related occupation.
1
  The highest 
paid professionals within these occupations are Sales Engineers, 
Financial Services Agents, Wholesale and Manufacturing Sales 
Representatives, Insurance Sales Agents, and Advertising Sales Agents.
2
  
The companies that employ these professionals have incentives to keep 
their top producers by creating compensation programs or providing 
“sales bonuses.”  These companies also have incentives to deter their top 
producers from migrating to their competitors.  While not exclusive to 
the sales industry, it is common for companies to feel the pressures of 
market competition and subsequently ask their employees to sign non-




In Wisconsin, the enforceability of such a non-compete was played 
out in the courts in a battle between Runzheimer International 
(Runzheimer) and Corporate Reimbursement Services, Inc. (CRS), two 
of the largest companies that provide vehicle reimbursement programs 
for employers.
4
  David Friedlen worked for Runzheimer in a sales 
position for fifteen years when he was presented with a restrictive 
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covenant.
5
  Upon threat of discharge, he signed the two-year non-
compete agreement in 2009.
6
  Two years later, Runzheimer fired him, 
and in 2012, Friedlen joined CRS in a sales role.
7
 
In Runzheimer’s suit against both Friedlen and CRS, the primary 
issue was whether “consideration in addition to continued employment 
[is] required to support a covenant not to compete entered into by an 
existing at-will employee.”
8
  The trial court concluded that the promise 
of continued employment was an illusory promise “because Runzheimer 
retained ‘the unfettered right to discharge Friedlen at any time, including 
seconds after Friedlen signed the Agreement.’”
9
  “[H]olding otherwise 
would allow an employer to obtain valuable rights from an employee on 
the promise of continued employment, but terminate the employee 
seconds after he signed the agreement.  The result would be that the 
employee ‘is bound by a non-compete in exchange for nothing in 
return.’”
10
  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, finding Wisconsin law on 




Before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Runzheimer contended that 
there should be no difference in how courts treat non-compete 
agreements entered into at the beginning of employment from those 
entered into after years of employment because, in either case, “the 
employer is promising employment,” and the continued employment 
constitutes the consideration for a non-compete signed by an existing 
employee.
12
  Friedlen countered that unlike the initial employment, 
which involves an exchange of “detriments and benefits,” an existing 
employee who signs a non-compete is in the same position before and 
after the covenant is executed.
13
  Thus, the employer provides no legal 
benefit nor suffers any legal detriment, the hallmarks of consideration, 
and the agreement is unenforceable without some consideration in 
                                                          
 5.  Id. at 882–83. 
 6.  Id. at 883. 
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App. Apr. 15, 2014), rev’d, 862 N.W.2d 879 (Wis. 2015). 
 9.  Runzheimer, 862 N.W.2d at 882. 
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addition to continued employment.
14
 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court appeared to be sensitive to the change 
in an employee’s bargaining position after employment has commenced. 
Runzheimer appears to minimize the vulnerable position of an 
employee who has worked for the same employer for a number of 
years.  The employee may develop specialized skills and knowledge 
that would transfer smoothly to an equivalent position for another 
employer—except for the newly established restrictive covenant.  
These skills and knowledge may not transfer so easily when a new 
position involves a different line of work.  Moreover, the employee 
may have grown much older and acquired family responsibilities not 
present when the employee was hired.  The inability to transfer easily 
to an equivalent job may reduce the employee’s bargaining power to 
negotiate a raise or bonus with the initial employer and may prevent the 
employee from terminating the employment relationship on his own 
timetable.  By contrast, an employee at the beginning of the 
employment relationship is likely to have more freedom to find 
alternative employment because he or she may not be burdened with 
some of these restraints.
15
 
Nevertheless, the Runzheimer majority held that an employer’s 
forbearance from terminating an employee is sufficient consideration for 
a non-compete covenant.
16
  Rather than rely on continued employment as 
consideration, the court reasoned: “Runzheimer’s promise not to fire 
Friedlen if he signed the covenant was not illusory because it was not a 
promise implicating Runzheimer’s future discretionary conduct.  Rather, 




Like many courts that address this issue, the Wisconsin court was 
apparently troubled by the implications of its forbearance rationale—that 
is, that an employer could immediately terminate an employee after a 
non-compete agreement was executed because there is no enforceable 
obligation of continued employment for any period of time.
18
  Struggling 
to find a limiting principle, the majority reasoned that an employee under 
such circumstances would have a remedy for fraud or breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
19
 
In a concurring opinion by then-Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, 
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 18.  Id. at 891–92. 
 19.  Id. 
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the obvious flaw in the court’s logic was revealed.  The employer 
promising not to immediately discharge makes no false statement, and 
without a misrepresentation, a claim of fraud would fail.
20
 
If all Runzheimer promised was to forbear from immediately 
terminating Friedlen’s at-will employment, on what basis could 
Friedlen assert a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
had Runzheimer fired Friedlen shortly after he signed the covenant not 
to compete?  The answer seems to be none.  An at-will employment 
contract specifically authorizes the employer to fire the employee at 
any time and for any reason.
21
 
Justice Abrahamson asserted that a promise by Runzheimer to refrain 
from firing Friedlen for a “reasonable time” after Friedlen signed the 
agreement would make the consideration valid and not illusory, and she 
read the majority opinion to so hold.
22
 
B. Article Overview 
In their seminal article on employee non-compete agreements, 
Professors Jordan Leibman and Richard Nathan coined the phrase 
afterthought agreement to describe non-compete covenants executed 
after an at-will employee has commenced employment.
23
  As in 
Runzheimer, employees are frequently presented with and sign non-
compete agreements after their initial hiring and after their employment 
contracts have already been established.
24
  Under contract law principles, 
the issue in afterthought cases is what constitutes sufficient consideration 




Policy issues permeate the afterthought agreement because of the 
potential abuse of bargaining power by employers.
26
  An employee’s 
bargaining power is substantially diminished after employment has 
commenced, and the threat of discharge is a potent weapon that 
                                                          
 20.  Id. at 895 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
 21.  Id. at 896. 
 22.  Id. at 896–97. 
 23.  Jordan Leibman & Richard Nathan, The Enforceability of Post-Employment 
Noncompetition Agreements Formed After At-Will Employment Has Commenced: The 
“Afterthought” Agreement, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1472 (1987). 
 24.  See id. 
 25.  See id. at 1473. 
 26.  See id. at 1548–49. 
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employers can use to secure an afterthought agreement.
27
  Courts have 
struggled to provide an effective check on this potential abuse of the 
employer’s superior bargaining position in the afterthought context. 
A lack of transparency and failure to disclose non-compete 
requirements during pre-employment negotiations is another concern 
with afterthought agreements.  One commentator has characterized a 
form of afterthought agreement as a cubewrap contract, where an 
employer presents a non-compete agreement to new hires shortly after 
employment has already been agreed to and commenced.
28
  This practice 
involves “springing” non-compete agreements on unsuspecting 
employees after the original terms of their employment have been 
negotiated and after their employment has started.
29
  Empirical evidence 
suggests this practice may be strategy-based: some firms wait until after 
employees have started working to present non-compete agreements, 
thereby leveraging the employee’s weaker bargaining position to secure 
consent.
30
  Our analysis of the afterthought context will include, but is 
not restricted to, the cubewrap contract scenario. 
Because of its significance from doctrinal and public policy 
perspectives, the issue of the afterthought agreement has spawned 
scholarly examination, with commentators suggesting alternative 
approaches to its resolution.
31
  The courts are also similarly divided on 
the issue.  The majority holds that continued employment is sufficient 
consideration for the employee’s promise not to compete; thus, no new 
                                                          
 27.  See id. at 1543. 
 28.  Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of 
Employee Bargaining Power Via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963, 966 
(2006) (coining the “cubewrap” contracts phrase).  The phrase cubewrap contracts refers to non-
compete agreements presented to employees—or left in their cubicles—after the employee has 
already accepted the employment offer and started work; this situation is analogous to the delayed 
disclosure of license terms under “shrinkwrap” agreements.  Id. at 977–78. 
 29.  Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form 
Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 640–41 (2007) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, 
Delayed Term] (arguing for mandatory pre-employment disclosure of non-compete agreements). 
 30.  Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical 
Professionals, 76 AMER. SOC. REV. 695, 700, 705–06 (2011) (finding, in a survey of 1,029 
engineers and interviews with 52 patent holders in automatic speech recognition industry, that non-
compete was included with the employment offer fewer than one-third of the time and that 
employees not presented with non-compete at time of offer were less likely to have a lawyer review 
the non-compete terms).  
 31.  See Leibman & Nathan, supra note 23, at 1573–74 (arguing for state statutes requiring that 
afterthought agreements be in writing, that employees not be subject to discharge for refusing to sign 
such agreements, but no new consideration should be necessary).  See also Kathryn J. Yates, Note, 
Consideration for Employee Noncompetition Covenants in Employments At Will, 54 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1123, 1137–39 (1986) (arguing that continued employment is sufficient consideration based on 
unilateral contract approach to issue). 
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consideration is necessary.
32
  This pragmatic view aligns with the 
traditional, employment-at-will doctrine.  The minority rule, on the other 
hand, requires “independent” or “separate” consideration such as a 
promotion, pay raise, or other consideration in addition to the employer’s 
promise of continued at-will employment.
33
  This strict contract law 
approach is consistent with the traditional judicial disfavor of employee 
non-compete agreements and in line with the common law pre-existing 
duty rule. 
We offer an alternative approach to the consideration issue in the 
afterthought context.  Neither the majority nor the minority rule provides 
standards that directly address the fundamental problem with the 
afterthought agreement, nor do they adequately address the balance of 
competing employer, employee, and societal interests.  The majority 
approach allows the employer the flexibility to alter the terms of the 
employment contract to further the needs of a changing business.  But 
this simple, practical solution comes at a serious cost to employees and 
open competition.  Under the majority rule, employers may be able to 
exploit their bargaining position and “force” employees to agree to a 
non-compete agreement or otherwise unfairly use an afterthought 
agreement to stifle competition. 
The minority rule’s requirement of independent consideration 
ensures that an afterthought agreement is mutually beneficial and 
presumably premised upon legitimate commercial interests of the 
employer.  It also tempers the employer’s bargaining power by requiring 
additional consideration in exchange for the afterthought agreement.  
However, the rule is over-inclusive—even a truly voluntary afterthought 
agreement that is justified by an employee’s increased knowledge of 
trade secrets or contacts with clients is unenforceable if there is an 
absence of independent consideration.  Thus, the minority rule is 
problematic because it fails to mitigate the potential exploitation of 
employers by employees who possess proprietary information, and it 
could conceivably permit unfair competition.
34
 
We contend that from a policy standpoint, a good faith standard is 
preferable to either of the existing paradigms.
35
  Unlike the majority rule, 
a good faith standard would preclude an employer from coercing an 
afterthought agreement or unfairly imposing a non-compete agreement 
                                                          
 32.  See infra Part III.A. 
 33.  See infra Part III.B. 
 34.  See infra Part V.B and accompanying text.  
 35.  See infra Part VI. 
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on an employee.  The requirement of good faith would provide an 
important deterrent to employers who might otherwise seek to unfairly 
use their superior bargaining position.  Additionally, a good faith 
requirement would provide a significant incentive for employers to be 
open and transparent during all stages of the negotiation process for an 
afterthought agreement.  Although the existence of separate 
consideration would be considered in the good faith determination, 
employers would not be required to demonstrate independent 
consideration to enforce an afterthought agreement.  The ultimate 
question would be one of good faith. 
Drawing from modern contract law and non-compete law relating to 
the reformation of overbroad non-compete agreements, we propose a 
two-prong test for good faith.
36
  The substantive component would 
consider the business justification for the afterthought agreement, 
including changes in the employment relationship and the extent to 
which the employer was seeking a non-compete covenant based on 
legitimate protectable interests in the protection of trade secrets or 
customer relationships.  The process component of the good faith 
standard would consider the means by which the employer secured the 
employee’s assent to the non-compete agreement, including whether the 
employee was apprised of the non-compete at the commencement of the 
relationship.  Bad faith would be presumed if the employer threatened 
discharge or engaged in other coercive actions to secure the consent of 
the employee.  Substantial consideration provided the employee in 
support of the afterthought agreement also would be considered in the 
good faith analysis but would not be determinative. 
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the present state of the 
law on employee non-compete agreements.  Parts III and IV discuss the 
majority and minority approaches to the consideration issue and analyze 
recent opinions of state supreme courts applying the two approaches.  
Part V provides a critical public policy analysis of the majority and 
minority positions.  Part VI justifies our recommended approach to the 
consideration issue, and Part VII proposes a framework for determining 
good faith in the afterthought context. 
II.  AGREEMENTS NOT TO COMPETE IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT 
Employee non-compete agreements implicate legitimate interests of 
                                                          
 36.  See infra Part VII. 
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employers, employees, and society.
37
  Employers have a need to protect 
their trade secrets and business goodwill from misappropriation by 
former employees.
38
  Although competition by former employees is 
inevitable, and non-compete agreements should not be the means by 
which open competition or new market entrants are stifled, employers 
have an interest in protecting the informational and relational interests of 
the firm.
39
  Thus, preventing unfair competition through the improper 
exploitation of an employer’s assets is the primary employer interest 
justifying restraints on post-employment competition. 
Former employees have a legitimate property interest in their own 
human capital development.
40
  They should be free to use the intellectual 
capital acquired at work in competition with their former employers, 
including the general knowledge, skills, and experience gained in the 
industry, so long as they do not misappropriate the employer’s property 
rights.
41
  Non-compete agreements implicate employee interests in 
mobility and professional advancement.
42
 
Society has an interest in protecting intellectual property rights and 
in preventing unfair competition.  The enforcement of employee non-
compete agreements, particularly in the protection of trade secrets, is part 
of an intellectual property law regime that is designed to provide 
incentives for the commercial development of new products, services, 
and ideas.
43
  Conversely, society needs to ensure that unnecessary 
barriers to entry into the marketplace are minimized to ensure a robust, 
competitive environment—the underlying driver of any capitalistic 
economy.
44
  Moreover, society has an important interest in the efficiency 
                                                          
 37.  This Article is an extension of our previous research and writing on employee non-compete 
agreements.  See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete 
Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107 (2008).  For 
a historical and policy discussion of employee agreements not to compete with employers after 
termination of employment, see Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 625 (1960), and T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition 
Cases, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2005). 
 38.  See Blake, supra note 37, at 653. 
 39.  See Leibman & Nathan, supra note 23, at 1483–90. 
 40.  See Katherine V.W. Stone, Commentary, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the 
Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 722 (2002). 
 41.  See id. at 758, 763. 
 42.  Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 259 (E.D. La. 1967) (“[T]he 
employee . . . must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to change jobs without abandoning the 
ability to practice his skills.”). 
 43.  See, e.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A 
Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 706–07 (1985). 
 44.  Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) (“[O]ur economy is 
premised on the competition engendered by the uninhibited flow of services, talent and ideas.”). 
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of markets for scarce human resources.
45
  To the extent that non-compete 
agreements impose unreasonable restrictions on labor mobility, they 
produce inefficient allocations within labor markets.
46
  Thus, while non-
compete agreements implicate conflicting societal interests in free and 
fair competition, the overriding policy concern is ensuring that 
competitive markets support and encourage innovation and 
entrepreneurship. 
A. The Development of the Law of Employee Non-compete Agreements 
Traditionally, the law of employee non-compete agreements was 
highly protective of the employee’s right to free mobility.
47
  Societal 
interests in free competition and open labor markets justified the 
suspicion of non-compete agreements.
48
  Most courts examined non-
compete agreements under a demanding reasonableness test that required 
employers to justify the necessity for and the reasonableness of any 
restriction on post-employment competition.
49
  In other jurisdictions, 
state restraint-of-trade statutes limited or prohibited the enforceability of 
covenants not to compete.
50
  Overall, the traditional legal environment 
was hostile to employee non-compete agreements, with courts carefully 
scrutinizing the “interests” sought to be protected by restrictive 
covenants and the “scope” of the restrictions necessary to protect those 
interests. 
Over time, however, a gradual change occurred in the law, with 
many jurisdictions employing a more permissive approach to non-
compete agreements than under the common law.
51
  This gradual shift in 
the law in favor of employer interests—what we refer to as the “modern” 
                                                          
 45.  Standard Brands, Inc., 264 F. Supp. at 259.  
[T]he employee who possesses the employer’s most valuable confidences is apt to be 
highly skilled.  The public is interested in the reasonable mobility of such skilled persons 
from job to job in our fluid society, which is characterized by and requires the mobility of 
technically expert persons from place to place, from job to job and upward within the 
industrial structure. 
Id. 
 46.  See Blake, supra note 37, at 627. 
 47.  See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 37, at 113–22. 
 48.  Id. at 114–15.  
 49.  Id. at 110–11, 114–20. 
 50.  Id. at 120–22. 
 51.  See id. at 122–35.  In his systematic analysis of state non-compete laws, Professor Bishara 
finds support for our finding of a “general increase in enforcement” in the United States under this 
modern approach.  Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement 
of Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 751, 780 (2011). 
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approach—has altered the traditional legal landscape.  Courts have 
broadened both the category of protected employer interests and the 
permissible scope of employee non-compete agreements.
52
  Courts have 
also been empowered to reform or rewrite the terms of unreasonable 
non-compete agreements so as to render them enforceable, thereby 
encouraging the use of broad standardized agreements.
53
 
The most recent opinions on employee non-compete agreements 
reveal an emerging new trend in the law.
54
  Many courts appear to be 
returning to the strict standards of the common law, adopting doctrines 
and rules that limit the enforceability of non-compete agreements.  This 
heightened judicial scrutiny of employee non-compete agreements is 
founded on an overriding policy interest in protecting employee mobility 
and supported by evidence of the positive effects labor mobility may 
have on entrepreneurship and economic development, particularly in the 
increasingly critical information technology sector.
55
 
The traditional academic view was that employee non-compete 
agreements are desirable from a macroeconomic perspective.  Post-
employment restraints were considered necessary to protect a firm’s 
investment in its employees and firm knowledge.
56
  By protecting trade 
secrets, such agreements provide an incentive for research and 
development and stimulate innovation.
57
  And, by preventing unfair 
competition, non-compete agreements are essential to the proper 
functioning of an efficient marketplace.
58
 
                                                          
 52.  See, e.g., Saliterman v. Finney, 361 N.W.2d 175, 178–79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (citing 
Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81, 92 (Minn. 1979) (holding that an 
injunction may be appropriate to protect confidential information even if the information is not a 
trade secret)). 
 53.  Garrison & Wendt, supra note 37, at 130–31.  For a discussion of the differing judicial 
approaches to overbroad non-compete agreements, see infra Part III. 
 54.  See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 37, at 135–48 (summarizing decisions of state supreme 
courts from 1999–2006 having doctrinal significance to the law of employee non-competes). 
 55.  See id. at 135–48, 164–73. 
 56.  See Callahan, supra note 43, at 715 (“To the extent that inventors are prevented from 
reaping the benefits of the information they develop, they are discouraged from engaging in costly 
research and development, and competition will suffer because fewer products will be produced.”).   
 57.  Blake, supra note 37, at 627.  
From the point of view of the employer, postemployment restraints are regarded as 
perhaps the only effective method of preventing unscrupulous competitors or employees 
from appropriating valuable trade information and customer relationships for their own 
benefit.  Without the protection afforded by such covenants, it is argued, businessmen 
could not afford to stimulate research and improvement of business methods to a 
desirably high level, nor could they achieve the degree of freedom of communication 
within a company that is necessary for efficient operation. 
Id. 
 58.  Stone, supra note 40, at 753–55. 
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Recent scholarly commentary from a broad range of disciplinary 
perspectives has challenged many of these classical assumptions about 
the beneficial impact of employee non-compete agreements.  
Management and law scholars have argued for greater legal protection 
for an employee’s “human capital” than under the traditional view, 
arguments founded on changes in the modern employment relationship
59
 




Economists and other scholars have found that laws restricting 
employee non-compete agreements can actually increase innovation and 
entrepreneurial activity.
61
  Strict enforcement of non-competes also 
discourages employees from investing in their own human capital and 
may have a detrimental impact on the level of R&D investments.
62
  The 
tremendous success of the IT sector in Silicon Valley has been attributed 
in part to the hyper labor mobility and information sharing prevalent in 
the region, with some scholars asserting that California’s prohibition on 
employee non-compete agreements facilitated that labor mobility and 
thus was a key driver in the rapid formation of new ventures in the 
region.
63
  Given the recent evidence on the economics of non-competes 
                                                          
 59.  See id. at 754–55 (arguing that under a new employment relationship that is characterized 
by lack of job security, employees should have substantial ownership rights to their “human 
capital”). 
 60.  See Kate O’Neill, ‘Should I Stay or Should I Go?’—Covenants Not to Compete in a Down 
Economy: A Proposal for Better Advocacy and Better Judicial Opinions, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 83, 
84 (2010) (arguing for non-compete enforcement to be dependent on employee’s relative bargaining 
power).  See also Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A 
Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. 
REV. 1163, 1167–68 (2001) (arguing for a “formation-based model” for enforcement of non-
compete agreements that considers bargaining positions and fairness of agreement; drawing analogy 
from judicial oversight of premarital agreements). 
 61.  See Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or 
Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI. 425, 436 (2011) (“We find that the enforcement of 
noncompete covenants moderates the effects that venture capital has on both innovation and the 
overall regional economy.  More specifically, our results imply that not only does the enforcement of 
noncompete agreements limit entrepreneurship, . . . but it also appears to impede innovation.”).  See 
also Deborah M. Weiss, Entrepreneurial Employees (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law; Univ. of 
Tex. at Austin Red McCombs Sch. of Bus., Working Paper Series, Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1868646 (finding that laws restricting employee 
non-compete agreements can increase innovation in industries where small firms have an innovative 
advantage over large firms). 
 62.  See Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive 
Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 379, 408 (2011). 
 63.  Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon 
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 578 (1999).  “Silicon 
Valley’s legal infrastructure, in the form of Business and Profession Code section 16600’s 
prohibition of covenants not to compete, provided a pole around which Silicon Valley’s 
characteristic business culture and structure precipitated.”  Id. at 609.  Professor Gilson’s thesis was 
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and the changing nature of the information-age employment relationship, 




Recently, employee non-compete agreements have come under 
political attack in a number of states, and restrictive legislation has been 
introduced in several of them.  A policy debate over the desirability of 
such agreements has been ongoing for some time in Massachusetts,
65
 and 
legislation is currently being considered that would render non-compete 
                                                          
based on the groundbreaking work of AnnaLee Saxenian and her study of Silicon Valley.  ANNALEE 
SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 
128 (1994).  She posited that the Valley’s culture of labor mobility, information sharing, and 
entrepreneurial activity created the booming industrial district.  Id. at 161–62.  She argued that 
Silicon Valley was dominated by small firms with frequent employee turnover and a culture of 
information sharing.  See id. at 2–3, 29–57.  This culture resulted in knowledge spillovers and new 
ventures that drove the rapid growth and technological advancement in the region.  Id. at 161–62.  
There is some empirical support for Gilson’s thesis that California’s non-compete policy was critical 
to the success of Silicon Valley.  Garmaise, supra note 62, at 410.  
Our empirical findings, though they do not allow for definitive conclusions, may indicate 
that firms in low-noncompetition enforcement jurisdictions are better suited to make 
investments in R&D.  This suggests that the success of Silicon Valley may in part be 
linked to California’s public policy of not enforcing covenants not to compete. 
Id.  See also Bruce C. Fallick et al., Job-Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the 
Micro-Foundations of a High Technology Cluster 20–21 (Inst. for the Study of Lab., FEDS Working 
Paper No. 2005-11, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=688446.  
This paper uses new data to compare the inter-firm mobility of college educated male 
employees in Silicon Valley’s computer industry to similarly educated employees 
working in the computer clusters in other cities.  The hyper mobility we document for 
Silicon Valley’s computer cluster is consistent with Saxenian’s account of agglomeration 
economies there: frequent job-hopping facilitates the rapid reallocation of resources 
towards firms with the best innovations.  Our finding of a “California” effect on mobility 
lends support to Gilson’s hypothesis that the unenforceability of [non-compete] 
agreements under California state law enhances mobility and agglomeration economies in 
IT clusters. 
Id. 
 64.  See Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to Determine 
Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 1022–30 (2012) (proposing framework 
based on the resource-based theory of the firm and knowledge-based perspective of competitive 
advantage).  See also Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with 
Noncompetition Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 922 (2010) (recommending legislative 
prohibition of employee non-competes based on IP concerns); Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to 
Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal 
Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 318–21 (2006) 
(arguing for stronger enforcement of non-competes against “service” employees than for “creative” 
employees).  We have proposed a framework that allows carefully tailored non-compete agreements 
designed to protect goodwill, but not trade secrets.  Garrison & Wendt, supra note 37, at 173–78.  
Trade secrets would not be considered a protectable interest, but would be protected under the trade 
secret law, particularly the inevitable disclosure doctrine.  Id. at 177–86. 
 65.  See Erik Weibust, Massachusetts Non-Compete Legislative Update, LEXOLOGY (July 24, 
2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f5443608-1f1e-427d-a704-7da7b75dae66. 
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covenants as “void and unenforceable.”
66
  Proponents of the law rely on 
the Silicon Valley success, particularly as it compares to the 
Massachusetts experience in promoting the IT sector.
67
 
B. The Present State of the Law of Employee Non-compete Agreements 
The present state of employee non-compete law reflects the 
development of the law over time and the conflicting standards adopted 
by jurisdictions, with some states adhering to the strict scrutiny of the 
common law and others adopting the more permissive modern view.
68
  
Thus, rather than a uniform approach among jurisdictions, current law is 
a patchwork of divergent judicial and statutory approaches.
69
 
On one end of the spectrum, a minority of jurisdictions take an 
extremely restrictive approach to employee non-compete agreements, 
typically under statutory controls.  California and North Dakota are the 
most restrictive states, prohibiting almost all employee non-compete 




On the other end of the spectrum, some jurisdictions have adopted a 
permissive approach to such agreements.
71
  The modern liberalization of 
state rules on employee non-competes has been achieved through a 
combination of statutory enactments and judicial modifications of the 
common law reasonableness test.  Florida has the most permissive law, 
having passed a pro-employer statute in 1996 that in many respects 
deviates from the common law.
72
  Ohio is illustrative of those 
                                                          
 66.  S. 169, 189th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2015). 
 67.  See Scott Kirsner, Big Shift: Governor Patrick Now Supports Making Noncompete 
Agreements Unenforceable in Massachusetts, BOSTON.COM (Sept. 10, 2013, 1:45 PM), http:// 
www.boston.com/business/technology/innoeco/2013/09/big_shift_governor_patrick_now.html.  
 68.  See Bishara, supra note 51, at 755–59, for the most comprehensive and systematic analysis 
of the relative enforcement of non-compete agreements across the United States. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008).  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2008).  
See also Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 577 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1994) (“California courts have consistently declared this provision an expression of public 
policy to ensure that every citizen shall retain the right to pursue any lawful employment and 
enterprise of their choice.”); Warner & Co. v. Solberg, 634 N.W.2d 65, 67 (N.D. 2001) (rejecting 
trade secret exception to § 9-08-06). 
 71.  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (2004) (stating that “[a]n employee may agree with an 
employer at the time of employment or at any time during his employment not to engage directly or 
indirectly in the same business or profession as that of his employer for any period not exceeding 
two years from the date of termination of the agreement”).  See also Am. Rim & Brake, Inc. v. 
Zoellner, 382 N.W.2d 421, 424 (S.D. 1986) (overbroad non-compete agreement permissible under 
statute without a showing of reasonableness). 
 72.  See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1) (2013) (“[E]nforcement of contracts that restrict or prohibit 
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jurisdictions that have moved toward a balancing-of-interests approach 
that is more protective of employer interests than the common law.
73
 
Most jurisdictions continue to adhere to the common law 
reasonableness approach, although there are significant variations among 
these states.
74
  The states differ in terms of the interests that can be 
protected under employee non-compete agreements
75
 and the permissible 
scope of such agreements.
76
 
The common law standard recognizes two primary “protectable” 
employer interests: trade secrets and goodwill.
77
  To justify a post-
employment restraint on competition, employers must demonstrate that a 
former employee will be engaged in some form of unfair competition, 
such as the pilfering of trade secrets or the improper diversion of clients 
or customers.
78
  Preventing competition per se is not a sufficient legal 
justification for a non-compete agreement
79
 even if the employee’s 
                                                          
competition during or after the term of restrictive covenants, so long as such contracts are reasonable 
in time, area, and line of business, is not prohibited.”).  
 73.  The leading “modern” cases in Ohio are Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544 (Ohio 
1975) (adopting reformation and multi-factor balancing test for employee non-competes) and Rogers 
v. Runfola & Associates, 565 N.E.2d 540 (Ohio 1991) (recognizing protectable interest in general 
training of employees).  
 74.  See, e.g., Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 539–40 (Wyo. 1993).  See 
also Bishara, supra note 51, at 780 (describing most jurisdictions as following “moderate” 
enforcement of non-compete agreements).  
 75.  Compare Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 160 N.E. 804, 806 (Mass. 1928) (no legitimate 
interest in preventing employee from using experience and instruction gained in employment) with 
Rogers, 565 N.E.2d at 544 (recognizing legitimate interest in training provided to employees). 
 76.  Compare Perry v. Moran, 748 P.2d 224, 229 (Wash. 1987) (en banc), modified, 766 P.2d 
1096 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (permitting non-compete that prevented former employee from 
servicing any client of former employer) with Mertz v. Pharmacists Mut. Ins. Co., 625 N.W.2d 197, 
204–06 (Neb. 2001) (invalidating as overbroad a non-compete agreement that prohibited a former 
employee from soliciting customers with whom the employee had no contact in his prior 
employment). 
 77.  E.g., Healthcare Servs. of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Copeland, 198 S.W.3d 604, 610 & n.6 (Mo. 
2006) (recognizing that Missouri courts follow the “modern rule”).  See also MO. REV. STAT. § 
431.202 (2010) (stating that a “reasonable covenant in writing promising not to solicit, recruit, hire 
or otherwise interfere with the employment of one or more employees shall be enforceable” if 
seeking to protect “[c]onfidential or trade secret business information” or “[c]ustomer or supplier 
relationships, goodwill or loyalty”). 
 78.  Whitmyer Bros. v. Doyle, 274 A.2d 577, 581 (N.J. 1971). 
 79.  Lord Atkinson stated the common law rule as follows:  
[The employer] is undoubtedly entitled to have his interest in his trade secrets protected, 
such as secret processes of manufacture which may be of vast value.  And that protection 
may be secured by restraining the employee from divulging these secrets or putting them 
to his own use.  He is also entitled not to have his old customers by solicitation or such 
other means enticed away from him.  But freedom from all competition per se apart from 
both these things, however lucrative it might be to him, he is not to be protected against.  
He must be prepared to encounter that even at the hands of a former employee.   
Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, [1916] 1 A.C. 688, 702. 
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ability to compete was enhanced by his work experience.
80
  Employees 
cannot be prevented from using the general skills and knowledge 
acquired through their employment in competition with their former 
employers because the law recognizes that employees have a right to 
their intellectual capital. 
The scope of an agreement not to compete also must be reasonable 
considering the employer’s business interest.  The terms of the restriction 
cannot be more extensive than necessary to serve that protectable 
interest.
81
  Courts consider the agreement in terms of time and 
geographic scope
82
 as well as the breadth of the restriction on post-
employment competitive activities.  The impact of the restriction on the 
employee and the effect on competition in the market are additional 
factors considered under the common law reasonableness test.
83
 
III.  EMPLOYEE NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS AND CONSIDERATION: 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE AFTERTHOUGHT AGREEMENT 
Overall, the law of employee non-compete agreements continues to 
reflect the common law disfavor of restrictions on post-employment 
competition.  Despite the permissive approaches taken by some 
jurisdictions in the modern era, most courts continue to carefully 
scrutinize the terms of such agreements.  Heightened judicial scrutiny of 
employee non-compete agreements, and the divergent approaches to 
employee non-compete agreements, are reflected in the case law on the 
afterthought agreement.  How the differing judicial approaches to the 
consideration issue fit into the current law of employee non-competes is 
explored in this section of the Article. 
                                                          
 80.  See Young, 160 N.E. at 806 (“[A]n employer cannot by contract prevent his employee from 
using the skill and intelligence acquired or increased and improved through experience or through 
instruction received in the course of the employment.”). 
 81.  The type of activities the employee is prohibited from engaging in under the non-compete 
agreement must be tied to the legitimate interests the employer is seeking to protect.  See, e.g., 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667, 682–85 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (covenant 
overbroad because it limited former employee from working for competitor in any capacity and 
precluded him from selling products that were not directly competitive). 
 82.  See Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 119 S.E.2d 533, 539 (S.C. 1961).   
[T]he general rule [is] that the territorial restraint in a covenant not to compete will, 
generally speaking, be considered reasonable if the area covered by the restraint is limited 
to the territory in which the employee was able, during the term of his employment, to 
establish contact with his employer’s customers. 
Id.   
 83.  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §§ 513–15 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
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A. The Majority Position on the Afterthought Agreement: Continued 
Employment as Sufficient Consideration 
A majority of jurisdictions hold that “continued employment [is] 
sufficient consideration” for a non-compete agreement signed by an 
existing employee.
84
  Courts adopting this position rely on several 
rationales.  Some courts find consideration in the employer’s promise to 
refrain from firing the employee, particularly where there has been 
explicit or implicit threat of termination if the employee refuses to sign 
the agreement.
85
  Other courts find consideration based on the 
employer’s promise of continued employment.
86
  Practical considerations 
have also been cited in support of the majority rule.  Several courts have 
noted that if additional consideration was required for an afterthought 
agreement, employers would be compelled to fire an employee on day 
one and then hire the employee back on day two after the employee 
executes a non-compete covenant.
87
  It is argued that there is thus “no 
substantive difference” between the employer’s initial promise of 
employment and a later promise of continued employment.
88
  To require 
new consideration in this setting is to glorify form over substance.
89
 
Under the majority rule, some courts require employment to continue 
for a substantial or reasonable period of time after the non-compete is 
executed.
90
  Otherwise, the employer could terminate an employee a 
minute after the employee signed a non-compete agreement and the 
employee would have “received nothing in exchange” for his new 
promise not to compete.
91
  This qualification to the majority rule is 
designed to prevent either a failure of consideration or bad faith on the 
part of the employer.
92
  In terms of what constitutes substantial 
                                                          
 84.  Yates, supra note 31, at 1130. 
 85.  E.g., Simko, Inc. v. Graymar, Co., 464 A.2d 1104, 1107 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983); 
Zellner v. Stephen D. Conrad, 589 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).  
 86.  E.g., Farm Bureau Serv. Co. v. Kohls, 203 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1972).   
 87.  McRand, Inc. v. van Beelen, 486 N.E.2d 1306, 1314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). 
 88.  Copeco, Inc. v. Caley, 632 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). 
 89.  Zellner, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 907 (“We will not encourage unnecessary legal dramatics.”). 
 90.  McGough v. Nalco Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 729, 745 (N.D. W. Va. 2007) (“Some courts, 
however, require the employment to continue for a ‘substantial’ or ‘reasonable’ period after the 
employee signs the covenant to become valid, or adequate, consideration.”).  See also Yates, supra 
note 31, at 1130–31 (“Nor will courts deem a promise of employment for as long as the employer 
wants it a bargained-for consideration.  Employment must continue for at least a reasonable time.”). 
 91.  Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 92.  See id.  See also Simko, Inc. v. Graymar, Co., 464 A.2d 1104, 1107 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1983) (observing that rather than require new consideration to ensure fairness of bargain, rule 
requiring substantial continued employment effectively prevents bad faith and failure of 
consideration if employer terminates employment shortly after agreement is executed).  
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employment, there is no numerical formula, although the courts 
generally consider employment for several years to be sufficient.
93
  What 
is substantial also depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding 




B. The Minority View: Requiring Separate or Independent 
Consideration 
A minority of states require some “separate” or “independent” 
consideration for an afterthought agreement to be binding.
95
  This 
position is arguably consistent with the common law pre-existing duty 
rule that modifications of a contract require new consideration to be 
binding.
96
  Thus, the modification of the employment agreement must be 
supported by some additional consideration—the afterthought agreement 
being “in the nature of a new contract . . . [requiring] new 
consideration.”
97
  A related argument is that the employer’s promise of 
continued at-will employment cannot constitute sufficient consideration 
because it is an illusory promise.  “A consideration cannot be constituted 
out of something that is given and taken in the same breath—of an 
employment which need not last longer than the ink is dry upon the 
signature of the employee . . . .”
98
 
Courts adopting the minority rule have also done so on public policy 
grounds.  There is a legitimate concern about the voluntariness and 
fairness of a non-compete agreement entered into after employment has 
commenced, particularly where the employee was not apprised of the 
non-compete covenant at the time of hire.
99
  After employment has 
                                                          
 93.  See Woodfield Grp., Inc. v. DeLisle, 693 N.E.2d 464, 469 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (citing 
Agrimerica, Inc. v. Mathes, 557 N.E.2d 357, 362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (considering two years 
substantial), abrogated on other grounds by Roy v. Coyne, 630 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)).  
But see Mid-Town Petrol., Inc. v. Gowen, 611 N.E.2d 1221, 1227 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (noting that 
seven months of “post contract employment was comparatively insubstantial”).   
 94.  Simko, 464 A.2d at 1107–08.  See also Grinspec, Inc. v. Lance, No. A-3313-01T1, 2002 
WL 32442790, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (recounting a situation where the employer 
considered employee’s performance as a factor for termination).  
 95.  Yates, supra note 31, at 1132–33. 
 96.  See infra notes 255–64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pre-existing duty 
rule.  
 97.  George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O’Brien, 347 A.2d 311, 316 (Pa. 1975) (citing James C. Greene 
Co. v. Kelley, 134 S.E.2d 166, 167 (N.C. 1964)). 
 98.  Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d 543, 548 (N.C. 1944). 
 99.  See, e.g., Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 130–33 (Minn. 1980) 
(noting that “[m]ere continuation of employment as consideration could be used to uphold coercive 
agreements” and refusing to enforce non-compete agreement without independent consideration 
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commenced, the employee’s ability to bargain has “markedly 
diminished”—presenting the risk of a coerced agreement or at the very 
least, an agreement that is not a product of equal bargaining positions.
100
 
Whether independent or separate consideration is present depends 
upon the status of the employee before and after the non-compete 
agreement, specifically whether the employer is bound to “additional 
duties or obligations”
101
 or whether the employee obtains some “real 
advantages”
102
 from the agreement.  Independent consideration can 
consist of increased salary or compensation, promotion or change of job 




Oregon has codified a more restrictive version of the minority rule in 
terms of independent consideration.
104
  The statute requires a bona fide 
advancement of the employee for an afterthought agreement to be 
enforceable.  A bona fide advancement has been interpreted to mean a 
material change in the employee’s “job content and responsibilities” and 
an improved “status within the company.”
105
  An increase in 
compensation or benefits without such a change in the employee’s status 
is not a bona fide advancement under this interpretation of the statute.
106
 
In 2007, the Oregon legislature amended its employee non-compete 
statute to require an employer to inform a prospective employee in 
writing “that a noncompetition agreement is required as a condition of 
employment.”
107
  In 2012, New Hampshire adopted a similar notice 
provision, which was amended in July 2014.
108
  The prior New 
                                                          
where employee did not have an opportunity to examine restrictive covenant until after quitting his 
old job and starting employment). 
 100.  PEMCO Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885, 890 (W. Va. 1979). 
 101.  Labriola v. Pollard Grp., 100 P.3d 791, 795 (Wash. 2004) (en banc). 
 102.  Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 131. 
 103.  Labriola, 100 P.3d at 794.  See also Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 
541 (Wyo. 1993) (recognizing that pay raise may be factored into the determination of independent 
consideration). 
 104.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1) (2011), amended by H.R. 3236, 78th Leg. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Or. 2015).  The statute in relevant part provides as follows: “A noncompetition agreement 
entered into between an employer and employee is voidable and may not be enforced by a court of 
this state unless . . . [t]he noncompetition agreement is entered into upon a subsequent bona fide 
advancement of the employee by the employer . . . .”  OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(a)(B). 
 105.  Nike, Inc. v. McCarthy, 379 F.3d 576, 583 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 106.  First Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co. v. Sumner, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240–41 (D. Or. 2002). 
 107.  OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(a)(A).  See also S. 248, 74th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 
2007) (enacted) (amending statute with additional requirements). 
 108.  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:70 (Supp. 2014) (amending N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
275:70 (2012)).  The prior version of the statute—effective from July 14, 2012 to July 27, 2014—
stated:  
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Hampshire notice provision applied to the initial employment and to a 
“change in job classification”; however, neither the prior nor the current 
New Hampshire law imposes an independent consideration requirement 
on the afterthought agreement as under the Oregon statute.
109
 
The pre-employment notice provisions are clearly in response to the 
practice of employers not disclosing non-compete requirements until 
after employment has commenced, the so-called cubewrap contracts.
110
  
By requiring transparency in the pre-employment process, these laws are 
designed to prevent this form of bad faith in the afterthought setting.  
Other jurisdictions may follow the lead of Oregon and New Hampshire.  
Recently, legislation to require pre-employment notice of non-compete 
agreements has been proposed in Connecticut, Illinois, and Michigan 
with varying degrees of success.
111
 
IV.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO THE 
AFTERTHOUGHT AGREEMENT 
Since 2001, state supreme courts have issued eight opinions on the 
issue of consideration for the afterthought agreement, including the 
Runzheimer case discussed in the introduction.
112
  The court decisions 
have split 4-4, revealing the substantial divisions among judicial policy 
makers on how to address the thorny consideration issue.
113
  A critical 
                                                          
Prior to or concurrent with making an offer of change in job classification or an offer of 
employment, every employer shall provide a copy of any non-compete or non-piracy 
agreement that is part of the employment agreement to the employee or potential 
employee.  Any contract that is not in compliance with this section shall be void and 
unenforceable. 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:70 (2012).   
 109.  See id. 
 110.  See Arnow-Richman, Delayed Term, supra note 29, at 640–41; James F. Hermon, Pending 
Legislation Threatens to Reshape Michigan Law Regarding Noncompete Agreements, LEXOLOGY 
(Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b0d9e5fa-5769-4963-929d-2c6f502 
690f3. 
 111.  In Connecticut, the proposed bill, “An Act Concerning Employer Use of Noncompete 
Agreements,” Public Act No. 13-309, was passed by the legislature, but vetoed by Connecticut’s 
Governor Dannel P. Malloy on Friday, July 12, 2013.  See H.B. 6658, 2013 Leg., Jan. 2013 Sess. 
(Conn. 2013), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/act/pa/2013PA-00309-R00HB-06658-PA.htm.  In 
Illinois, H.B. 0016, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011) died in committee.  See H.B. 0016, 
2013 Leg., 97th Sess. (Ill. 2013), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocTypeID= 
HB&DocNum=16&GAID=11&SessionID=84&LegID=54394.  Michigan’s H.B. 4198, 98th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015) is currently in committee.  Arkansas opted for the majority rule by statute.  
S.B. 998, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015), or Act 921—signed by Governor Asa 
Hutchinson on April 1, 2015, and effective on August 6, 2015—provides that continued employment 
is sufficient consideration for a covenant not to compete. 
 112.  See infra Part IV.A–G. 
 113.  See id. 
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analysis of these opinions demonstrates the weaknesses and inadequacies 
of the majority and minority rules and provides support for our position 
that a good faith requirement would be a preferable policy approach to 
resolving the consideration issue. 
A. Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc. 
In Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc.,
114
 the South Carolina Supreme 
Court had an opportunity to consider the appropriate resolution of the 
consideration issue.  The case involved Carol Poole, an at-will employee 
of a travel agency, Incentives Unlimited, who was presented with a non-
compete agreement three and a half years after her initial employment.
115
  
She executed the agreement because she was told that she had to sign it 
to keep her job.
116
  Her position with Incentives Unlimited did not 
change, however.
117
  Poole later left the company and began working for 
another travel agency in violation of the non-compete agreement.
118
  She 
sued Incentives Unlimited when her former employer refused to transfer 
certain cruise bookings, and the employer counterclaimed for Poole’s 
violation of the restrictive covenant.
119
  Both the trial court and the 
intermediate appeals court rejected the argument advanced by Incentives 
Unlimited that the continued employment was sufficient consideration 
for the non-compete agreement.
120
 
The Poole court recognized that consideration was an essential 
element of an enforceable non-compete agreement and that at-will 
employment can provide the necessary consideration for a non-compete 
agreement entered into at the inception of the relationship.
121
  Whether 
continued employment is sufficient consideration for a covenant 
executed “days, months, or even years after the initial employment offer” 
was considered a more difficult question.
122
  It found the minority 
position persuasive, citing specifically to the North Carolina Supreme 
Court decision in Kadis v. Britt.
123
  “[W]e adopt the rule that when a 
covenant is entered into after the inception of employment, separate 
                                                          
 114.  548 S.E.2d 207 (S.C. 2001). 
 115.  Id. at 208. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  See id.  
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 209. 
 122.  Id.  
 123.  Id. (citing Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. 1944)). 
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consideration, in addition to continued at-will employment, is necessary 
in order for the covenant to be enforceable.”
124
  Because Poole’s duties 
and salary were not changed when the non-compete agreement was 
signed, the agreement was unenforceable.
125
 
Poole demonstrates the rigidity and formalism of the minority rule.  
Certainly, Incentives Unlimited had a legitimate interest in protecting its 
customer relationships from an employee who had been with the travel 
agency for three and a half years.  Under the minority rule, however, the 
court does not have to consider the legitimate interests of the employer—
the effect of which in Poole was to allow the former employee to leave 
the agency and engage in unfair competition by exploiting the customer 
relationships she developed with her former employer.  To the extent that 
Poole was coerced into signing the non-compete agreement, the opinion 
may have reached the correct result.  But a good faith standard that 
considers more than just the presence of independent consideration 
would result in a more flexible and pragmatic approach to the 
afterthought agreement in cases like Poole. 
B. Lake Land Employment Group of Akron, LLC v. Columber 
The Ohio Supreme Court opted for the majority rule in Lake Land 
Employment Group of Akron, LLC v. Columber.
126
  Lee Columber 
worked for Lake Land Employment Group from 1988 until 2001.
127
  He 
signed a non-compete agreement in 1991, but he recalled very little about 
the circumstances surrounding its execution.
128
  He recalled reading and 
signing the agreement, but he did not know whether he had discussed the 
agreement with Lake Land nor whether he had been told that his 
continued employment was contingent upon his signing it.
129
  He did not 
receive any separate consideration for the non-compete agreement.
130
 
In a 4-3 decision, the Columber majority held that “consideration 
exists to support a noncompetition agreement when, in exchange for the 
assent of an at-will employee to a proffered noncompetition agreement, 
the employer continues an at-will employment relationship that could 
                                                          
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
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legally be terminated without cause.”
131
  The majority reasoned that an 
at-will employment relationship is a bilateral contract—the employee 
promising to work in exchange for the employer’s promise to pay the 
agreed compensation, both promises made on an at-will basis.
132
  As 
such, either party is free to propose a change to the contract at any 
time.
133
  Therefore, the presentation of a non-compete agreement 
constitutes a proposal to renegotiate the terms, which if accepted, is 
supported by consideration because “[t]he employee’s assent to the 
agreement is given in exchange for forbearance on the part of the 
employer from terminating the employee.”
134
 
The court added a caveat to its opinion, responding to the courts and 
commentators who have asserted that there must be adequate 
consideration for an afterthought agreement, such as substantial 
continued employment.
135
  Given the court’s “forbearance” rationale, it 
naturally rejected any inquiry into the adequacy of the continued 
employment.
136
  The majority believed that its refusal to require adequate 
consideration did not preclude a challenge to an afterthought non-
compete agreement on other grounds.
137
  The court was apparently 
suggesting that a discharge shortly after an employee executes a non-
compete agreement could be unconscionable or subject to challenge 
based on other contract defenses, such as duress or fraud.
138
  It seems 
clear, however, that the court did not adopt the qualification to the 
majority rule that continued employment must be for a substantial time, 
although the majority was obviously uncomfortable with the implication 
from its opinion that an employer was free to terminate an employee 
immediately after he or she signed a non-compete agreement. 
The majority opinion in Columber was not necessarily surprising.  
Ohio had often been considered among the jurisdictions following the 
majority rule,
139
 and it is one of the jurisdictions that adopted a 
permissive approach to the enforceability of employee non-compete 
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agreements.
140
  What was surprising was the close split within the court 
and the strong dissenting opinions in the case.  The dissenters not only 
challenged the majority’s underlying assumptions but also pointed out 
the negative policy implications of the opinion.  The first dissenting 
justice noted that there was no legal detriment to the employer, nor any 
legal benefit to the employee, the hallmarks of consideration.
141
  She 
noted that the court’s forbearance logic actually proved the contrary 
proposition because the “employer ha[d] relinquished nothing,” retaining 
the same right to discharge the employee before and after the 
modification.
142
  “[W]hen all is said and done, the only difference in the 
parties’ employment relationship before and after [the modification] is 
the noncompetition agreement. . . . It is precisely because the same at-
will employment relationship continues that there is no consideration.”
143
  
The second dissent was more direct in the criticism of the forbearance 
rationale—stating that the court’s opinion sanctioned duress by the 




Columber demonstrates the practical utility of the majority approach.  
Employers benefit from the ability to adjust the terms of an employment 
contract as the employment relationship develops over time, and thereby 
protect their interests in trade secrets or goodwill.  From an economic 
reality perspective, the majority approach better captures the nature of 
the afterthought agreement than the minority rule. 
However, the forbearance rationale adopted by the Columber court is 
particularly problematic, as pointed out by the dissent.  Rather than insist 
upon an afterthought agreement that is truly voluntary, this rationale may 
actually encourage employers to threaten employees with discharge to 
secure their consent to non-compete covenants.  Employers wanting to 
establish that they have, in fact, given up their right to terminate in 
exchange for the employee’s non-compete agreement (a bargained for 
exchange) may be tempted to present afterthought agreements on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis.  The court’s suggestion that other defenses might be 
effective at deterring employer bad faith also seems unpersuasive.  None 
of the traditional contract defenses—fraud, duress, or undue influence—
appear to be effective at preventing employer wrongdoing because the 
law recognizes an almost unfettered right to terminate an at-will 
                                                          
 140.  Garrison & Wendt, supra note 37, at 123–27.  
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employee. 
Also, in contrast to the minority rule, the majority approach does not 
consider the interests of the employee in an open and fair negotiating 
process.  It provides no incentive for an employer to negotiate non-
compete agreements at the inception of employment, to be transparent in 
those negotiations, or to temper its bargaining power in the afterthought 
negotiations.  A good faith standard that factors in the broader interests 
of employees provides a more balanced approach to the competing 
interests of employers and employees. 
C. Labriola v. Pollard Group, Inc. 
The Washington Supreme Court addressed the consideration issue in 
Labriola v. Pollard Group, Inc.
145
  Anthony Labriola was hired by 
Pollard Group in 1997 as an at-will salesperson under a written 
employment contract containing a restrictive covenant.
146
  Five years 
later, he was presented with a new three-year non-compete agreement 
that was much broader in scope, precluding him from competing or 
working for a competing firm within seventy-five miles of Pollard 
Group’s location in Tacoma, Washington.
147
  Labriola received no 
additional benefits or separate consideration in exchange for the non-
compete covenant.
148
  In fact, a few months after he executed the non-
compete agreement, Pollard Group altered his compensation package, 
raising the minimum sales threshold for commissions from $25,000 to 
$60,000.
149
  Because the new commission schedule would substantially 
reduce his income, he looked for another sales position.
150
  Once his 
attempts to leave were discovered, he was fired and a prospective 
employer was warned by Pollard Group that it intended to enforce 
Labriola’s non-compete agreement.
151
  When the prospective employer 
did not hire Labriola, he commenced a lawsuit seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the 2002 non-compete agreement was unenforceable.
152
 
The Labriola court embraced the minority rule, stating that the 
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decision followed “longstanding” jurisprudence in the state.
153
  A non-
compete agreement entered into after employment has commenced 
requires independent consideration, “new promises or obligations 
previously not required of the parties.”
154
  Because Labriola received no 
additional benefits and the employer incurred no additional obligations 
under the non-compete agreement, the court found that the continued 
employment did not serve as the independent consideration necessary for 
the employee’s non-compete promise.
155
 
The court rejected the employer’s claim that “instruction served as 
[the needed] consideration.”
156
  Because training was not mentioned in 
the non-compete agreement, and the employer never intended to provide 
the employee with additional benefits, any training was not the bargained 
for consideration.
157
  “[The] Employer did not promise instruction as 
consideration for Employee’s promise not to compete.”
158
  Moreover, the 
employer could not demonstrate that the training received after the non-
compete agreement was any different from the training before the 
agreement, indicating that no new consideration was being provided in 
the form of instruction.
159
 
The Labriola court adopted a strict two-fold standard for the 
independent consideration requirement.  First, the employee must receive 
new benefits or the employer must incur new obligations for independent 
consideration to be present.  To make this determination, the court will 
examine the employee’s position before and after the non-compete 
agreement, as it did with regard to the promise of training.  If the 
employee’s status has changed in terms of pay or responsibility, 
independent consideration is present.  But if the employee is receiving 
the same benefits before and after the non-compete agreement, the 
independent consideration requirement is not satisfied.  Conceivably, 
even an increase in pay or promotion would not be sufficient if the 
employee would have received the benefits with or without the non-
compete agreement. 
Second, the independent consideration must be the consideration 
bargained for in exchange for the non-compete promise.  The nature of 
any independent consideration should obviously be memorialized in the 
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agreement itself to avoid the employer’s problem in Labriola where the 
agreement did not mention the consideration for the non-compete and 
specifically did not mention training as the consideration.  The court’s 
approach to the minority rule may create difficulties for unsuspecting 
employers, a trap for the unwary employer who either does not provide 
separate consideration or does not adequately document the employee’s 
change in status. 
Labriola illustrates one of the weaknesses of the majority approach 
and one of the reasons for the continuing appeal of the minority rule.  To 
some extent, the impact of the afterthought agreement is to bind the 
employee more tightly to the employer.  Exiting the employer’s business 
becomes even more difficult because of the in terrorem effects of non-
compete covenants.  The mere existence of the non-compete deters 
prospective employers from hiring an employee burdened by a restrictive 
covenant, and as in Labriola, the threat to sue a prospective employer if 
they hire a former employee can be a potent weapon in the employer’s 
arsenal.  Without even the necessity of the costs of a non-compete 
lawsuit, the Pollard Group effectively prevented the employment of 
Labriola, leaving the former employee to sue to protect his rights. 
Thus, continued employment may exist for some time in the 
afterthought cases not because employers are acting in good faith—
which is the assumption of the majority rule courts—but because 
employees believe they have no choice but to stay.  A better approach is 
to consider all aspects of good faith to ensure that afterthought 
agreements are truly voluntary and do not unnecessarily restrict 
employees’ freedom of mobility. 
D. Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly 
The Vermont Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Summits 7, Inc. v. 
Kelly
160
 adopting the majority rule was not entirely unexpected, as the 
state had embraced a permissive approach to employee non-compete 
agreements.
161
  The case involved a young woman, Staci Lasker, who 
was hired in 2000 by Summits 7, a printing and copying company.
162
  
She started in customer service and later became a sales assistant, 
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salesperson, and eventually a supervisor before she left the company in 
2003.
163
  One year after she was hired, Summits 7 required her to sign a 
non-compete agreement, and she was later required to sign a second 
agreement in 2002 after Summits 7 acquired another company and took 
on additional services.
164
  The afterthought agreements were without 
independent consideration and prohibited her from working for any 
direct or indirect competitor in Vermont, New Hampshire, and parts of 
New York.
165
  She voluntarily left Summits 7 in 2003 and went to work 
for a direct competitor in a nearby locale.
166
 
In holding that continued employment, standing alone, was sufficient 
to support a non-compete agreement entered into after the 
commencement of an at-will employment relationship, the majority of 
the court reasoned that there is no practical or substantive difference 
between a non-compete promise made at the inception of an employment 
relationship and one made during the course of that relationship.
167
  The 
consideration in either case, the court observed, is the “initial or 
continued employment,” or alternatively the employer’s “forbearance 
from terminating the at-will employment relationship.”
168
  The court 
concluded: “Regardless of what point during the employment 
relationship the parties agree to a covenant not to compete, legitimate 
consideration for the covenant exists as long as the employer does not act 




As in Columber, the majority opinion prompted a strong dissent.  
The dissent observed that there was no consideration from a legal benefit 
or legal detriment perspective.  “Because Summits 7 relinquished 
nothing, and Lasker gained nothing, any consideration was illusory.”
170
  
The dissent also noted that the public policy concerns underlying the 
judicial scrutiny of non-compete agreements were ignored by the 
majority—particularly the employer’s abuse of its superior bargaining 
position to coerce a non-compete promise.  “By finding consideration 
under these circumstances, the majority has eviscerated the public policy 
concerns requiring consideration for—and close scrutiny of—covenants 
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not to compete in employment relationships.”
171
 
The Summits 7 court avoided the facts in the case that pointed to bad 
faith on the part of the employer.  The non-compete the employer 
required Lasker to sign was problematic for two reasons.  First, it was 
unclear whether or not the employer had any protectable interest to 
support the agreement not to compete.  Lasker was with the company for 
three years, starting as a low-level employee and eventually becoming a 
“supervisor.”  She was involved in sales as an assistant and then as a 
salesperson, but there is no indication that she had established the type of 
personal relationships with customers that could be exploited.  The trial 
court held that “Lasker’s general development as an employee—her 
learning how to handle increased responsibilities concerning the 
business—was adequate consideration” for the non-compete,
172
 but this 
type of general knowledge, skills, and experience is not generally 
sufficient to justify a restrictive covenant. 
Second, the non-compete Lasker signed was facially overbroad even 
if the company had a protectable interest in its customer relationships.  
The agreement extended to all of Vermont, New Hampshire, and parts of 
New York.  It also precluded her from working “in any capacity” for a 
direct or “indirect” competitor of Summits 7.  The unreasonableness of 
the covenant should have called into question the actual purpose of the 
agreement.  Was it to protect the business interests of the employer?  If 
so, why was the restriction not tied to those interests, directed at 
precluding competitive activities or soliciting former customers?  Or was 
it designed to simply prevent her from working in the industry—that is, 
using her experience with another employer in the trade?  The trial court 
suggested as much in its determination of consideration.  The Summits 7 
court addressed only the geographic scope of the agreement, refused to 
consider the overbreadth problem, and concluded that the non-compete 
agreement should be enforced because the former employee went to 
work for a local direct competitor. 
The Summits 7 court also did not address the pressure used to secure 
Lasker’s consent to the non-compete covenants.  As the dissent noted, a 
person of her limited means and education had little choice but to 
consent to the demand that she sign the non-compete agreements.  
Summits 7 demonstrates the inadequacy of the majority approach that 
focuses solely on continued employment of the employee.  It suggests 
that a focus on both the substantive problems with the non-compete 
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agreement and the issues relating to the negotiation process under a 
broader good faith standard would be a preferable approach. 
E. Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez 
Another recent afterthought opinion is the 2008 decision of the 
Montana Supreme Court in Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez.
173
  Andy 
Hernandez was hired by Access Organics to sell organic produce and 
later promoted to sales manager.
174
  Four months after he was hired and a 
month after his promotion, he signed a non-compete agreement that 
prevented him from “directly or indirectly compet[ing]” with Access 
Organics for two years.
175
  Having financial difficulties, Access Organics 
laid him off shortly after he signed the agreement.
176
  Hernandez returned 
to the company on a part-time basis, but shortly thereafter, however, he 
voluntarily left Access Organics and started his own business with 
another former employee selling both organic and conventional produce 
in competition with Access Organics.
177
  The district court found that 
Hernandez contacted customers he knew before he joined Access 
Organics as well as contacts he gained during his short time with his 
former employer.
178
  The trial court found the necessary consideration for 
the agreement in the continuation of his employment and enjoined 
Hernandez “from contacting any current or former client of Access 
Organics” in the sale of organic produce.
179
 
The Access Organics court relied heavily on the strong state public 
policy disfavoring non-compete agreements under the state’s restraint-of-
trade statute, a law designed to protect a person’s right to freely engage 
in a chosen occupation or profession.
180
  The court essentially adopted 
the minority position on the consideration issue.  In the absence of 
independent consideration, “additional job security,” or a promise of a 
definite extended term of employment, the continued employment of an 
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The court recognized the potential for employer unfair bargaining to 
secure an afterthought agreement, and this risk of overreaching justified 
a probing judicial examination of the afterthought agreement.  But the 
court, by adopting the minority rule, did not examine whether in fact 
there was bad faith in the bargaining process.  In terms of bad faith, the 
record is somewhat conflicting.  The timing of the presentment of the 
non-compete in Access Organics can be viewed as suggestive of bad 
faith.  The non-compete was neither presented at the beginning of the 
employment relationship nor was it part of the promotion.  But it is not 
clear whether there was any pressure on Hernandez to sign the non-
compete agreement, and Access Organics certainly had a legitimate 
interest in protecting its customer relationships.  The overbreadth of the 
afterthought agreement is more troubling particularly when it is 
combined with the delay in presenting the agreement.  At two years, the 
agreement was relatively long and the scope was quite broad—
preventing both direct and indirect competitive activities and arguably 
including the sale of conventional produce.  Hernandez may not have 
been willing to enter into such an overbroad agreement had he been 
presented with it at the time of hire. 
F. Lucht’s Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Horner 
The Colorado Supreme Court adopted the majority rule in Lucht’s 
Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Horner.
182
  Tracy Horner was hired by 
Lucht’s Concrete Pumping, a commercial and residential concrete 
contractor primarily doing business in Denver, as the “key person” to 
lead its business expansion into Summit County, Colorado.
183
  Horner 
was responsible for developing and maintaining customer relationships 
in that area.
184
  Two years after he was hired, he was requested to and did 
sign a non-solicitation and confidentiality agreement.
185
  Horner was not 
offered any form of pay increase, promotion, or any kind of additional 
benefits when he signed this agreement.
186
  One year later, Horner left 
the company and went to work for Everist Materials, a supplier of ready-
mix concrete, with many of the same customers in the mountain region 
as his former employer.
187
  Shortly thereafter, Everist Materials entered 
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the concrete pumping business with Horner as its pumping manager—in 
apparent violation of the one-year non-solicitation agreement.
188
  In 
Lucht’s Concrete Pumping’s suit against Horner, the trial court granted 
summary judgment against Lucht’s and concluded that the non-compete 
agreement was “unenforceable due to lack of consideration,” and the 
court of appeals affirmed, adopting the minority rule.
189
 
Despite the strong public policy against non-compete agreements in 
Colorado,
190
 the Colorado Supreme Court reversed this holding.
191
  The 
court noted the long-standing rule that a covenant not to compete as any 
other contract must be supported by consideration, and “some 
consideration, regardless of its relative value” is all that is necessary to 
support a non-compete agreement.
192
  Noting that the giving up of a legal 
right can constitute such consideration, the court held that the employer’s 
forbearance from terminating an employee constitutes the necessary 
consideration for the agreement with the existing at-will employee.
193
 
The Lucht’s Concrete court found no distinction between 
consideration at the inception or during the course of employment.
194
  At 
both stages, the parties are free to negotiate the employment terms and 
employees are free to accept or reject modified conditions, just as they 
are free to accept or reject the initial offer.
195
  The court also observed 
that to require employers to terminate and then rehire employees to 
secure the benefit of a non-compete covenant “would create a perverse 
incentive for employers”
196
 in the at-will employment setting. 
The court did not address the inherent problem with mid-stream 
changes in the employment-at-will context and the practical leverage the 
employer has in this setting.  Had it considered that element and 
conducted a good faith analysis of the afterthought agreement, the court 
may have concluded that there was no bad faith.  From a substantive 
perspective, Lucht’s Concrete Pumping appeared to have a legitimate 
protectable interest in its customers, and the non-solicitation agreement 
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was a limited restraint tied to that goodwill interest.  Moreover, there was 
no apparent evidence of coercion by the company in securing Horner’s 
consent to the agreement, nor was there any indication that the timing of 
the company’s request was a bad faith negotiating tactic. 
The court was concerned, however, with the logical implications of 
its forbearance rationale.  Because the value of consideration is not 
important, and the employer’s consideration is giving up the right to 
terminate at the time of the non-compete agreement, an employer could 
secure a non-compete on the first day of hire and terminate the employee 
on next day.
197
  Nevertheless, the court suggested that such conduct 
would be a factor in the overall reasonableness analysis of the non-
compete agreement,
198
 but it failed to identify how factors bearing on 
consideration play into that assessment, a determination that generally 
focuses on the necessity for and substantive terms of a particular 
restrictive covenant. 
Lucht’s Concrete follows the majority rule in not requiring separate 
consideration to enforce a non-compete agreement, with the qualification 
that the agreement, including the consideration to support it, meets the 
reasonableness standard for non-compete agreements.  It is unclear, 
however, whether the court’s reasonableness qualification will temper 
the potential abuse by employers of their superior bargaining positions.  
By “folding” consideration into the reasonableness analysis, the court 
adds another dimension to the array of majority rule opinions struggling 
to deal with the implications of the underlying forbearance rationale. 
G. Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown 
One of the most recent afterthought opinions is the 2014 decision of 
the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown.
199
  
The Creech court adopted the position that continued employment, 
standing alone, is insufficient to support an afterthought agreement.
200
  In 
doing so, the court distinguished several prior Kentucky cases that had 
enforced non-compete agreements signed after employment had 
commenced.
201
  The Creech court’s analysis of those precedents, 
however, muddies the clarity of the new rule it announced. 
The case facts were relatively simple and straightforward.  Donnie 
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Brown had worked eighteen years for Charles T. Creech, Inc., advancing 
to a sales position in this business that provides hay and straw to farms in 
Kentucky.
202
  Two years prior to his departure, he signed a “Conflicts of 
Interests” agreement that included a three-year non-compete covenant.
203
  
In an apparent violation of the contract, Brown went to work for Standlee 
Hay Company—a competitor—and solicited customers he had serviced 
at Creech.
204
  The ensuing lawsuit eventually reached the Supreme Court 
of Kentucky after the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s 
summary judgment for Standlee and Brown, concluding that “Brown’s 
continued employment with Creech constituted sufficient consideration” 
as a matter of law.
205
 
Prior case law in Kentucky appeared to support the Court of 
Appeals’ decision.  In Higdon Food Service, Inc. v. Walker,
206
 the 
Supreme Court of Kentucky found the employee’s continued 
employment and a good faith standard for termination in an afterthought 
agreement sufficient to render a non-compete covenant enforceable.
207
  
The Higdon court reasoned that there was consideration in two respects.  
First, the “hiring itself (or rehiring, if one prefers that word) was 
sufficient consideration” because the company “did not have to hire [the 
employee]—or keep him on—at all.”
208
  Second, the employment 
contract could be terminated only for a “good faith” determination that 
the employee’s services were “no longer satisfactory” or “no longer 
needed.”
209
  Thus, the employee had acquired some new consideration 
under the employment contract.
210
 
The Creech court also had to finesse Central Adjustment Bureau v. 
Ingram Associates, Inc.,
211
 an opinion in which the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals had adopted a variant of the majority rule.  The court concluded 
that as long as employment continues for an “appreciable length of 
time”
212
 and the employee is not involuntarily terminated, an afterthought 
agreement is enforceable.
213
  The court reasoned that under such 
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circumstances “the employer has fulfilled an implied promise to continue 
the employee’s employment . . . .”
214
 
The Creech court ignored the Court of Appeals holding in Central 
Adjustment Bureau and proceeded to distinguish the case.
215
  
Significantly, Donnie Brown was a long-term employee at Creech, 
whereas the employees in Central Adjustment Bureau signed the non-
competes within weeks or months after the commencement of 
employment.
216
  The employees in Central Adjustment Bureau also 
received specialized training, raises, and promotions after signing the 
non-compete agreements, but Brown did not.
217
 
By narrowly reading Higdon and distinguishing Central Adjustment 
Bureau, the Creech court manages to identify the “common thread” in 
the cases; that is, the “employment relationship between the parties 
changed” after the non-compete was signed.
218
  The Creech court 
recognized that, in Higdon, it was the change in status from an at-will 
employee to a more protected employee under the “good faith” discharge 
limitation.
219
  In Central Adjustment Bureau, it was the change in 
employment terms, specifically the training, promotions and 
compensation increases.
220
  In contrast, “Brown received no 
consideration from Creech in exchange for signing the Agreement or 
after he signed the Agreement.”
221
 
As a result, the Creech court adopts a modified version of the 
minority rule.  Continued employment, standing alone, is not sufficient 
for an afterthought agreement.  Consideration will exist, however, if 
there is independent consideration at the time of the execution of the 
non-compete or provided after the covenant is signed.  Unlike the 
minority rule adopted in Labriola and other minority rule jurisdictions,
222
 
the independent consideration does not have to be part of a bargained-for 
exchange. 
Also, it is unclear under Creech whether this new rule on continued 
employment applies to the cubewrap contract cases in which non-
competes are signed shortly after employment has commenced.  Given 
                                                          
 214.  Id. 
 215.  See Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345, 354 (Ky. 2014). 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id.  
 219.  See id. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  See supra Part IV.C.   
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the court’s discussion of Central Adjustment Bureau, it would appear 
that such cases would be treated differently.  Perhaps this different 
treatment is based on the rationale that the non-compete is 
contemporaneous with the initial employment, or this scenario is a 
technical “hiring” under the language of Higdon. 
Finally, the impact of a threat to discharge is uncertain under Creech.  
The lack of any threat to discharge was one the facts the court cited in 
distinguishing Central Adjustment Bureau: “Creech, unlike Central, did 
not threaten Brown with loss of his job if he did not sign the 
Agreement.”
223
  An employer giving up the right to terminate “at-will” 
could be viewed as providing the necessary consideration or this could 
constitute a “rehire” under Higdon.
224
  But, of course, giving up the 
immediate right to terminate is just the other side of the continued 
employment coin, which the Creech court finds insufficient.  
Nevertheless, under this reading of Creech, employers may be 
encouraged to threaten discharge to establish consideration in the 
afterthought context. 
The court had some evidence of bad faith in Creech, which may have 
been one of the underlying equitable reasons for its decision.  Shortly 
after securing the non-compete agreement, Creech demoted Brown from 
his job as a salesperson to a dispatcher.
225
  In that sense, the case is 
similar to Labriola, where the employer altered the employee’s 
compensation package after a new, more restrictive non-compete 
covenant was signed.
226
  But the Creech court does not explicitly rely on 
the employer’s bad faith conduct in tying its holding to whether 
continued employment is sufficient consideration for an afterthought 
agreement.  Arguments made in an amicus filing by labor groups, which 
urged the court to consider the policy issues underlying employee non-
compete agreements, were rejected.
227
  What emerges from Creech is a 
lack of clarity on the application of the minority rule in Kentucky and, 
yet, another opinion that fails to provide a coherent, policy-based 
approach to the consideration issue. 
                                                          
 223.  Creech, 433 S.W.3d at 354. 
 224.  See Higdon Food Serv., Inc. v. Walker, 641 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Ky. 1982) (stating that the 
employment agreement signed by Walker ostensibly included a good faith provision where the 
employment “shall continue only as long as the services rendered by the Employee are satisfactory 
to the Employer, regardless of any other provision contained in [the] agreement”). 
 225.  See Creech, 433 S.W.3d at 347–48 (“This job change did not involve any change in salary 
but did result in Brown having decreased responsibilities and little to no direct customer contact.”). 
 226.  See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text. 
 227.  See Creech, 433 S.W.3d at 351–52. 
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H. Summary 
The recent afterthought opinions reflect a continuing split among the 
courts regarding the consideration issue.  The weaknesses of both the 
minority and majority approaches are evident from a reading of these 
decisions, pointing to the need for an alternative approach based on more 
than a simple, myopic focus on either independent consideration or 
continued employment. 
V. CONSIDERATION FOR THE AFTERTHOUGHT AGREEMENT: A 
CRITICAL POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETING APPROACHES 
A. The Futility of a Contract-Based Analysis of the “Afterthought” 
Agreement 
As in Creech, courts addressing the consideration issue in the 
afterthought context have struggled to apply traditional contract law rules 
to the employment relationship.  From a doctrinal standpoint, reasonable 
arguments can be made in support of the minority and majority rules, as 
noted by the most recent afterthought opinions and dissents.  And even 
though pages and pages of court opinions and law articles have been 
devoted to the issue, traditional contract law rules relating to 
consideration will not provide a proper resolution of the consideration 
issue in the afterthought context. 
Either rule can be justified or critiqued based on an application of 
contract law.  By requiring independent consideration, the minority 
approach follows the traditional pre-existing duty rule of contract law.  
Modification of a contract generally requires new or additional 
consideration to be binding—something more than the initial 
consideration provided by a party.  A promise to do what one is already 
required to do is not sufficient for a modification.  Thus, it can be 
persuasively argued that an employer’s promise of indefinite 
employment is nothing more than what has already been promised an 
existing employee.  Courts adopting the majority rule have to engage in 
strained reasoning to find consideration on the part of an employer who 
suffers no legal detriment in exchange for the employee’s promise not to 
compete. 
On the other hand, courts adopting the minority rule and finding 
consideration for a non-compete at the inception of the employment 
relationship but not during the course of that relationship are faced with 
an inherent inconsistency.  In either situation, the employee’s promise 
not to compete is supported only by the employer’s promise of indefinite 
2015] GOOD FAITH STANDARD FOR NON-COMPETES 445 
employment.  If one is analyzing the issue from a strictly contract 
doctrine perspective, it is unclear why the law should recognize the 
employer’s promise of indefinite employment as consideration at the 
beginning but not during the relationship.  The employment-at-will 
doctrine presents a similar problem of logical consistency.  It does not 
necessarily make sense to say that an employer can terminate a contract 
of employment-at-will but does not have the right to change the terms of 
the contract at-will. 
The root problem is the employment-at-will doctrine.  At-will 
employment is at its core a legal fiction—a “contract” that is based on 
what otherwise would be characterized as illusory promises.
228
  As one 
commentator noted, the “at-will relationship is not the result of a true 
contract,” and therefore traditional common law principles are “ill-suited 
to the task” of resolving issues of consideration under the at-will 
employment relationship.
229
  This commentator has also posited that 




At least one court has rejected the majority and minority approaches 
as being “misguided.”
231
  In McGough v. Nalco Co., the court found that 
decisions on the afterthought agreement were actually not based on 
consideration: “By resting decisions solely on consideration grounds, 
courts actually disguise the true reasons for their decisions, which instead 
are grounded in equitable doctrines of fairness.”
232
  The court followed 
Alabama common law, where continued employment was sufficient 
consideration for an afterthought agreement, but it considered other 




The McGough court was not persuaded by the rationale or logic of 
the majority rule.  Because an employer gives up nothing to secure the 
employee’s non-compete promise in the afterthought setting, there is no 
“corresponding restriction” on the employer’s power to discharge and the 
promise is illusory.
234
  Moreover, the requirement of “substantial” 
                                                          
 228.  Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A Consideration of 
Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 773–74 (2006).  
 229.  Id. at 774. 
 230.  See id. at 749–50 (“[C]ourts . . . are ignoring both the requirement that the consideration be 
bargained for and that . . . ‘in practice it is performance which is bargained for.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
 231.  McGough v. Nalco Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 729, 747 (N.D. W. Va. 2007). 
 232.  Id. (citing Yates, supra note 31, at 1127). 
 233.  Id. at 741–43. 
 234.  Id. at 747. 
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continued employment is inconsistent with fundamental contract law 
principles: having to look back to the time when the contract is formed at 
some uncertain point in the future breeds unpredictability.
235
 
The court was equally critical of the minority approach.  By 
assessing whether “benefits promised or conferred . . . are substantial 
enough to warrant an exchange for a signed covenant,” courts are in 
effect judging the adequacy of consideration contrary to basic contract 
law.
236
  And because this judgment about the adequacy of consideration 
is subjective and after the fact, the “approach also breeds uncertainty.”
237
 
The McGough court’s critique of the majority and minority 
approaches reflects the unsound premises underlying those rules.  To 
develop a legal framework for resolving the competing interests in the 
afterthought context on traditional conceptions of legal detriment and 
legal benefit is inherently flawed and results in the problems associated 
with either approach identified by the court.  Rather than build a 
framework on such flawed premises, we contend that an approach to the 
afterthought agreement based on an analysis of the policies underlying 
contract law, the employment-at-will doctrine, and employee non-
compete law is both necessary and desirable. 
Stated simply, such an approach needs to consider the competing 
employer, employee, and societal interests in the afterthought context.  
How do we allow employers the flexibility to adjust and adapt the terms 
of the employment relationship to protect business assets and also protect 
employees from unfair bargaining tactics in the afterthought context?  
And how do we do that under a framework that is consistent with 
contract law but sensitive to the societal interests in free and fair 
competition by former employees?  A critical analysis of the majority 
and minority courts’ approaches provides insight on an alternative 
approach to the afterthought agreement. 
B. A Policy Analysis of the Minority Rule 
The minority rule, which requires separate consideration for an 
afterthought agreement, is defensible from a public policy perspective.  
The policies underlying the pre-existing duty rule are implicated by the 
afterthought agreement.  That rule is designed in part to prevent the old 
hold-up game, as with the contractor who “extorts” a promise of 
                                                          
 235.  Id. at 747–48. 
 236.  Id. at 748. 
 237.  Id. (citing Tracy L. Staidl, The Enforceability of Noncompetition Agreements When 
Employment Is At-Will: Reformulating the Analysis, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 95, 108 (1998)). 
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Arguably, this underlying policy rationale supporting the pre-
existing duty rule applies to the afterthought agreement.  In fact, the 
bargaining power wielded by an employer may present an even stronger 
argument for additional consideration than the traditional hold-up game 
scenario.  The employer may gain an unfair advantage after employment 
has commenced and be able to use its superior bargaining position to 
secure an agreement during the course of employment that it might not 
have been able to secure during the initial negotiations. 
The employer’s leverage in “negotiating” the afterthought agreement 
is substantially enhanced by the employment-at-will doctrine and the 
lack of any remedy for an employee discharged for refusing to sign a 
non-compete agreement.  Outside of California, the courts have 
uniformly held that an employee fired for refusing to sign a non-compete 
agreement has no claim for wrongful discharge under the public policy 




An illustrative example of the bargaining power of employers in this 
context was presented in Maw v. Advanced Clinical Communications, 
Inc.
240
  Karol Maw was employed as a graphic designer for four years by 
Advanced Clinical Communications, Inc. (ACCI), a firm providing 
educational programs in the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries.
241
  
In 2001, the company decided that all employees at the level of 
“Coordinator” would be required to sign an employment contract with 
non-disclosure and non-compete provisions.
242
  The non-compete clause 
precluded an employee for a period of two years after termination from 
working for a competitor of ACCI or one of ACCI’s customers.
243
 
The non-compete agreement was problematic for multiple reasons.  
It did not serve any legitimate interest of ACCI because Maw had no 
                                                          
 238.  See infra notes 259–60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the hold-up game.  
 239.  See Michael J. Garrison & Charles D. Stevens, Sign This Agreement Not to Compete or 
You’re Fired! Noncompete Agreements and the Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will, 15 
EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J. 103 (2003). 
 240.  846 A.2d 604 (N.J. 2004).  See generally Michael J. Garrison, Limiting the Protection for 
Employees from Compelled Noncompete Agreements Under State Whistleblower Laws: A Critical 
Analysis of Maw v. Advanced Clinical Communications, 20 LAB. LAW. 257 (2005) (discussing the 
Maw decision). 
 241.  Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc’ns, Inc., 820 A.2d 105, 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2003), rev’d, 846 A.2d 604 (N.J. 2004).   
 242.  Id. at 110. 
 243.  Id.  
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knowledge of protected trade secrets in her position.
244
  She had little if 
any knowledge of the content and technical aspects of the materials she 
helped produce and had no greater access to proprietary information than 
clerical employees, who were not required to sign the employment 
contracts.
245
  The non-compete was also patently unreasonable in terms 
of scope and time.  For two years, Maw was prohibited from working in 
any capacity for an ACCI competitor or customer.
246
 
Finally, ACCI did not act in good faith in the negotiation process.  
ACCI urged employees to secure “independent counsel” to review the 
terms of the afterthought agreement.
247
  After consulting an attorney, 
Maw attempted to negotiate changes to the agreement, specifically a 
shorter non-compete period, but she was informed that ACCI’s President 
would not permit any modifications to the agreement.
248
  When she 
refused to sign the agreement, she was fired.
249
 
Maw sued ACCI under New Jersey’s public policy exception to 
employment-at-will and the state’s whistleblower statute, the 
Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA).
250
  Despite long-
standing judicial disfavor of non-compete agreements in New Jersey, the 
court found no clear mandate of public policy implicated in the firing.
251
  
The court was concerned with “alter[ing] the traditional contract 
remedies available in restrictive-covenant litigation.”
252
  Thus, even if a 
non-compete agreement is on its face unreasonable, which appeared to 
be the case in Maw, an employee refusing to sign it has no legal remedy 
for this form of employer overreaching. 
Maw and the majority of courts that have addressed the wrongful 
discharge issue place employees presented with an afterthought 
agreement in an extremely vulnerable position.  In effect, employers can 
present broad, standardized non-compete agreements on a “take-it-or-
leave-it” basis and hold the threat of discharge over their employees’ 
heads to compel an “agreement.”  Employees can sign such agreements, 
but they then risk the cost and expense of defending lawsuits brought to 
enforce the non-compete covenants and the potential impact on 
                                                          
 244.  Id. at 114–15. 
 245.  Id. at 111, 114. 
 246.  Id. at 109.  
 247.  Id. at 111.  
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Id.  
 250.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to -8 (2011); Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc’ns, Inc., 
846 A.2d 604, 606–07 (N.J. 2004).   
 251.  Maw, 846 A.2d at 609. 
 252.  Id. 
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prospective employers who may be concerned with a lawsuit for 
intentional interference with a contract if they hire an employee “bound” 
by a restrictive covenant. 
By requiring “independent” or “separate” consideration, the courts 
temper that bargaining power, and protect employees to some extent 
from the economic leverage that employers possess in the afterthought 
context.  The minority rule also provides an incentive for employers to 
secure promises at the start of the employment relationship because, 
without separate consideration, an afterthought agreement is not 
enforceable. 
Like any prophylactic rule, however, the minority approach is over-
inclusive.  It protects employees from employer overreaching in some 
cases, but it may result in unfair competition by employees in others.  
Had the Lucht’s Concrete court invalidated what appeared to be a 
voluntary and limited non-solicitation agreement because of a lack of 
independent consideration, the employee could have directly competed 
with his former employer by exploiting his relationships with the former 
employer’s customers. 
C. A Policy Analysis of the Majority Rule 
Despite the arguments for the minority rule, the majority position has 
considerable merit from a policy perspective.  It can be persuasively 
argued that the law should reflect the economic realities of the 
employment relationship rather than follow a formalistic approach to the 
consideration question.  The Columber court’s pragmatic approach 
comes close to capturing the practical reality of the modern employment 
relationship.  The court’s characterization of the employment 
relationship as a continually evolving one, where terms are constantly 
being changed, has appeal.  Thus, viewing the presentation of a non-
compete agreement to an existing at-will employee as a proposal to alter 
the terms that is accepted by continued employment seems to reflect the 
economic reality of the situation. 
However, courts adopting the majority approach have struggled to 
find a limiting principle for the continued employment rule.  Taken to an 
extreme, the underlying forbearance rationale is problematic.  As the 
dissent in Columber suggested, this rationale may actually encourage 
employers to threaten employees with discharge or engage in other 
coercive practices to secure assent to a non-compete agreements.  By 
threatening discharge to secure an afterthought agreement, the employer 
can more easily demonstrate that the non-compete was bargained for; the 
price offered and paid was the employer’s giving up of its immediate 
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right to terminate.  So, rather than limiting an employer’s bargaining 
power, the majority approach may actually sanction this abuse of power. 
Moreover, none of the policing approaches suggested by the courts 
in Runzheimer, Columber, Lucht’s Concrete, and Summits 7 provide an 
effective check on employer bad faith or overreaching in the afterthought 
context.  The qualification to the majority rule that employment must 
continue for a substantial period of time addresses only one form of bad 
faith in the afterthought context, and it does not address the fundamental 
problem of the employer’s superior bargaining position.  The suggestion 
in Columber and Runzheimer that other defenses—i.e., fraud, duress, 
breach of the covenant of good faith, or unconscionability—can provide 
a check on employer bad faith is not persuasive.  All of these defenses 
are either too limited or inapplicable to the problems with the 
afterthought agreement.  The most plausible defense, economic duress, 
generally requires a wrongful threat and a lack of feasible alternatives.
253
  
But if an employer has a legal right to discharge an employee-at-will, it 
is difficult to conceive of an argument that the employer’s threat to 
discharge or use of that power is duress or that the employee is left 
without a reasonable alternative.
254
  Finally, integrating the consideration 
issue into the reasonableness analysis of the non-compete, as suggested 
in Lucht’s Concrete, is difficult both conceptually and from a policy 
standpoint.  How the consideration received by the employee is related to 
the need for and scope of a non-compete covenant is not clear, nor is it 
apparent how the consideration calculus would be part of the 
reasonableness test.  Generally, consideration—like protectable 
interest—should be a threshold issue.  Without a valid contract and a 
protectable interest, a non-compete is unenforceable regardless of how 
reasonable or limited a restraint is imposed on the employee. 
VI.  AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE CONSIDERATION ISSUE IN THE 
AFTERTHOUGHT AGREEMENT CONTEXT 
What is needed is an approach to the afterthought agreement that 
carefully balances the interests of employers and employees but places 
the burden on the employer to justify the voluntariness of any 
                                                          
 253.  See, e.g., Oskey Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Cont’l Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1281, 1286 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(citing W. R. Grimshaw Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Co., 248 F.2d 896, 904 (8th Cir. 1957)) (holding 
that the party must be left with “no other alternative”).  
 254.  See, e.g., Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co., 464 A.2d 1104, 1108 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. 
denied, 469 A.2d 452 (Md. 1983) (finding no duress despite threat to discharge, employee had 
reasonable alternative because similar jobs were available).   
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modification of the employment contract.  Just as the reasonableness 
standard of the common law results in the invalidation of voluntarily 
executed non-compete agreements, the law should impose some 
constraint on the afterthought agreement, particularly given the potential 
for the use of unfair bargaining power by employers.  While the concern 
of the law of employee non-competes is primarily with the substance of 
the agreement, the primary concerns in the afterthought context are with 
the unfair bargaining power wielded by employers in this setting and the 
unfair bargaining power’s detrimental impact on employee mobility and 
free competition.  Any approach should provide an incentive for an 
employer to negotiate a non-compete agreement at the inception of the 
employment relationship and ensure that any agreement secured after the 
fact is truly voluntary. 
On the other hand, any approach to the issue should ensure that 
employers have the flexibility to adapt employment relationships as 
business needs change, just as they retain the power to terminate the 
relationship in response to market conditions.  One benefit of the 
majority rule is that it allows employers to alter the terms and conditions 
of employment as the employee’s responsibilities, knowledge, or 
experience develops, without legal impediments or unnecessary 
formalistic requirements.  Requiring independent consideration imposes 
too great a constraint in the modern workplace environment and may be 
inconsistent with the practical realities of the new information-age 
employment relationship. 
A. Contract Law and Good Faith Modifications 
We believe that the requirement of consideration for an afterthought 
agreement should ultimately be satisfied if the parties in good faith agree 
to a non-compete covenant.  Such a good faith requirement is consistent 
with and supported by modern contract and sales law, particularly the 
limitations on the pre-existing duty rule in article 2-209 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code
255




Under the common law pre-existing duty rule, the promise to 
                                                          
 255.  See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“An agreement 
modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding.”). 
 256.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A promise 
modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is binding (a) if the 
modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the 
contract was made . . . .”). 
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perform an existing contractual obligation was not sufficient 
consideration for a modification of a contract.
257
  Additional or new 
consideration is required because the promisor suffers no “legal 
detriment” by committing to perform that which the promisor was legally 
obligated to perform, nor does the promisee receive a “legal benefit” 




The common law rule had the salutary effect of preventing the hold-
up game and other improper tactics used by contracting parties to secure 
an additional advantage under a pre-existing contract.
259
  The hold-up 
game, as with a contractor who threatens to quit a partially performed 
contract unless additional compensation is paid, can be used effectively 
to secure an advantageous modification.
260
  A party “coerced” into such a 
modification by the other party was protected under consideration law 
and did not have to rely on other more limited defenses, including 
economic duress.  Thus, the common law pre-existing duty provided a 
check on abusive practices in the modification context. 
The pre-existing duty rule has been criticized by commentators and 
courts.
261
  One flaw in the rule is the problem of “changes in 
                                                          
 257.  Kevin M. Teeven, Development of Reform of the Preexisting Duty Rule and Its Persistent 
Survival, 47 ALA. L. REV. 387, 388 (1996).  
The preexisting duty rule provides that a promise to [perform], or the performance of, an 
existing legal duty is not valid consideration for a promise.  Thus, if a creditor agrees to 
accept less than the contract amount at the due date, or if a contractor is promised more 
than the contract amount to complete a project, such promises are not binding.  The rule 
encompasses modifications, accords, and discharges of preexisting duties. 
Id. 
 258.  E.g., McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Wash. Capital DUS, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 93 (5th Cir.), 
opinion corrected on denial of reh’g, 70 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1995).  
In general, under the “pre-existing duty rule,” an agreement to do what one is already 
bound to do cannot serve as “sufficient consideration to support a supplemental contract 
or modification.”  This rule usually comes [into] play when one party becomes unhappy 
with the contract as agreed upon and wants to change it.  He has to offer some new 
consideration to the other party to induce that other party to agree to the change.  Thus, 
merely offering the preexisting duty he had already contracted to perform cannot serve as 
consideration for the change. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 259.  See, e.g., Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 103 (9th Cir. 1902) (holding that 
the promise to pay seamen more money when they refused to work was unenforceable because the 
seaman were already obligated to perform the work under the original contract).  
 260.  ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE 
RULES OF CONTRACT LAW 105 (West Publ’g Co. 1963).  Professor Corbin coined the phrase hold-
up game to describe situations in which one of the parties to a contract extorts a favorable contract 
modification by threatening not to perform. 
 261.  See Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the UCC: Good Faith and 
the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849, 852 (1979) (“[M]any courts came to 
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circumstances” surrounding the contract, particularly changes that make 
it more difficult or costly for a party to perform.
262
  Under the pre-
existing duty rule, the parties do not have the flexibility to modify merely 
the contract price to accommodate such detrimental changes.  Given the 
difficulties of anticipating the multitude of market or other circumstances 
that might impact the profitability of a contract, the pre-existing duty rule 
limitations on renegotiated contracts may result in considerable 
unfairness.
263
  Moreover, if the primary purpose of the rule is to prevent 




Consequently, over time the courts have liberalized the pre-existing 
duty rule by creating exceptions and qualifications to its application.
265
  
To address the scenario of changed circumstances justifying a contract 
modification, many jurisdictions have adopted an exception for 
unexpected circumstances.
266
  The exception for good faith adjustments 
based on unanticipated changes has been embraced by the Restatement 
                                                          
believe that parties should be permitted to voluntarily alter their agreements because of changes in 
circumstances.  Because the pre-existing duty rule is a roadblock to the free adjustment of contracts, 
the rule lost favor with courts and commentators . . . .”). 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  See, e.g., Meech v. City of Buffalo, 29 N.Y. 198 (1864) (describing a case where a 
contractor confronted quicksand during sewer installation). 
 264.  See Daniel A. Graham & Ellen R. Peirce, Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis of 
the Hold-Up Game, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1989, at 9, 14.  
Because of its absoluteness, [the pre-existing duty rule] fails to distinguish between 
situations in which the party desiring modification is in fact playing a hold-up game and 
one in which such party is motivated by the discovery of circumstances or the occurrence 
of unexpected events that makes his performance far more burdensome than originally 
expected. 
Id. 
 265.  Hillman, supra note 261, at 852–54 (describing theories of rescission, gift, and waiver as 
“legal fictions” to avoid negatives of the pre-existing duty rule).  
 266.  One of the leading cases is King v. Duluth, M. & N. Railway, 63 N.W. 1105 (Minn. 1895).  
The King court enforced a modification under which a contractor was promised additional 
compensation because of unanticipated problems with construction, stating the requirements of this 
exception as follows: 
What unforeseen difficulties and burdens will make a party’s refusal to go forward with 
his contract equitable, so as to take the case out of the general rule and bring it within the 
exception, must depend upon the facts of each particular case.  They must be substantial, 
unforeseen, and not within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made.  
They need not be such as would legally justify the party in his refusal to perform his 
contract, unless promised extra pay, or to justify a court of equity in relieving him from 
the contract; for they are sufficient if they are of such a character as to render the party’s 
demand for extra pay manifestly fair, so as to rebut all inference that he is seeking to be 
relieved from an unsatisfactory contract, or to take advantage of the necessities of the 
opposite party to coerce from him a promise for further compensation.   
Id. at 1107. 
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(Second) of Contracts under section 89, which provides in part: “A 
promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either 
side is binding (a) if the modification is fair and equitable in view of 
circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was 
made . . . .”
267
 
The most significant departure from the common law has come with 
the adoption of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).  The 
drafters of the UCC abolished the pre-existing duty rule for sales 
contracts in section 2-209(1), which reads: “An agreement modifying a 
contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding.”
268
  The 
clear purpose of the rule was to allow parties the flexibility to freely 
modify their sales contracts, with or without new consideration.  The 
practical necessities of an efficient marketplace demanded the break with 
the formalism of the common law. 
But the UCC drafters also recognized the problems with coerced 
modifications under the hold-up game scenario, and the comments to 
section 2-209 qualified the language of the section.
269
  The UCC’s 
requirement of good faith prevents the unfair use of a party’s bargaining 
position either to secure a modification that is not truly voluntary or one 
that is not supportable by “legitimate commercial reason[s].”
270
 
Courts interpreting section 2-209 have fashioned standards that 
operationalize the section 2-209 comments regarding good faith.
271
  One 
of the leading cases is Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp.
272
  The 
case involved a typical scenario in which a supplier, Sharon Steel, 
“renegotiated” a sales contract because of changes in market conditions 
by threatening not to honor its delivery obligations.
273
  In determining 
whether there was good faith modification, the court developed a two-
part test: 
The first inquiry is relatively straightforward; the party asserting the 
modification must demonstrate that his decision to seek modification 
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was the result of a factor, such as increased costs, which would cause 
an ordinary merchant to seek a modification of the contract.  The 
second inquiry, regarding the subjective honesty of the parties, is less 
clearly defined.  Essentially, this inquiry requires the party asserting the 
modification to demonstrate that he was, in fact, motivated by a 
legitimate commercial reason and that such a reason is not offered 
merely as a pretext.  Moreover, the trier of fact must determine whether 
the means used to obtain the modification are an impermissible attempt 
to obtain a modification by extortion or overreaching.
274
 
Applying this two-part good faith test, the court found that Sharon 
Steel met the first part because it was facing substantial future losses on 
its contracts and because the change in market conditions would cause 
“an ordinary merchant to seek a modification.”
275
  However, the threat to 
stop selling steel unless Roth Steel agreed to the modification was 
considered bad faith under the second prong of the test.  Although 
“coercive conduct” is evidence of bad faith, the court noted that 
“showing may be effectively rebutted by the party seeking to enforce the 
modification.”
276
  Sharon Steel argued that the presumption was rebutted 
because it was allowed to raise its prices under the terms of the original 
contract.
277
  But the court found that the contract language could not be 
so construed, and Sharon Steel had never asserted its contract rights as 
justification for its threat to cease deliveries.
278
 
Good faith has an objective (or substantive) and subjective (or 
process) component under modern consideration law.  For a good faith 
modification, the party benefiting from the change must demonstrate a 
reasonable commercial justification for the modification.  Under the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the objective or substantive part of 
the good faith standard—unanticipated circumstances—is more 
restrictive than under section 2-209.  But under both tests, the 
commercial reason for the modification is part of the calculus.  The 
subjective or process component focuses on the “actual” reason for 
seeking a modification and the means used to secure the modification.  
This element ensures that proffered justifications are not a pretext to 
secure an unreasonable modification and that the modification was not 
coerced by improper threats. 
The standards developed by the courts under section 2-209 and the 
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Restatements provide a general framework for our proposed good faith 
requirement in the afterthought context.  We believe that this two-part 
framework can be adapted to the non-compete setting.  As the next 
section demonstrates, some courts have developed good faith standards 
in regard to the reformation of an overbroad non-compete agreement.  
Those standards provide a useful parallel to the analogous case of the 
afterthought agreement. 
B. Good Faith and the Reformation of Non-Compete Agreements 
Traditionally, the common law permitted the partial enforcement of 
an overbroad non-compete agreement only under limited circumstances, 
if at all.  In some jurisdictions, an overbroad non-compete was 
considered void per se, and the courts refused to permit enforcement in 
any way.
279
  This continues to be the rule in Wisconsin by statute.
280
  In 
other jurisdictions, courts permitted partial enforcement under the blue 
pencil doctrine.  However, the formalistic blue pencil doctrine allowed 
enforcement only when it was grammatically possible to sever the 
language of the non-compete clause, but it did not empower the courts to 
change the non-compete agreement.
281
 
In the modern era, there has been a distinct movement from the blue 
pencil doctrine to a rule of reformation.
282
  Both by statute and court 
decision, courts have been empowered to rewrite the terms of a non-
compete agreement and to enforce it as reformed.
283
  Reformation is 
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considered a superior policy approach because it allows the courts to 
enforce a reasonable agreement not to compete consistent with the 
reasonable expectations of the parties.
284
 
As with the afterthought agreement, courts adopting the rule of 
reformation have been concerned about the potential for employer 
abuse.
285
  In this context, the primary concern is with employer 
overreaching.  Employers may be tempted to draft onerous, overbroad 
non-compete agreements on the assumption that there is no penalty for 
such conduct, other than reformation of the agreement; but the agreement 




As a result of this potential for employer overreaching, courts 
following the rule of reformation may refuse to reform and enforce a 
non-compete agreement when an employer intentionally drafts an 
overbroad agreement or otherwise acts in bad faith.
287
  This is the 




Courts in several recent opinions have developed demanding 
standards to assess good faith in the reformation setting.  In Merrimack 
Valley Wood Products, Inc. v. Near,
289
 the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court addressed the reformation of a non-compete agreement that 
restricted Near, a former salesperson, from selling goods to any customer 
of his former employer for a period of one year after termination of 
employment.
290
  The agreement was deemed overbroad because the 
employer had over 1,200 customers, and the employee serviced only 
sixty of these customers.
291
  The trial court refused to reform the non-
compete agreement based on the bad faith of the employer.
292
  During the 
hiring process, the employer never informed Near that he would be 
required to sign a non-compete covenant.
293
  Only after working for six 
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months, Near was presented with the non-compete agreement and 




Although this was an afterthought agreement, the court did not 
address the issue of consideration.  Rather, in refusing to grant 
reformation, the court found bad faith on the part of Merrimack Valley in 
securing the overbroad non-compete agreement.
295
  The court agreed that 
the lack of advance notice was not the same as bad faith, but other facts 
supported the trial court’s judgment.
296
  These included the delay of six 
months in presenting the agreement to Near as well as the coercion in 
securing his consent.
297
  His consent to the afterthought agreement was 
necessary for him to retain his position, and the trial court concluded that 
he was in “no position to decline” the employer’s demand.
298
 
The Merrimack Valley court focused on the negotiating process and 
the means by which the employer secured consent to the overbroad non-
compete agreement.  The court could have analyzed the good faith of the 
employer from a substantive standpoint, but conflicting precedents in 
New Hampshire law created a lack of clarity on the permissible scope of 
a non-compete designed to protect goodwill interests.
299
 
In Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc.,
300
 the Idaho Supreme Court 
refused to reform an overbroad non-compete agreement based on the 
substance of the agreement.  As in Merrimack Valley, the non-compete 
agreement was unreasonably overbroad.  The non-compete covered the 
entire client base of the employer, a large group of past and present 
clients that the employer had serviced throughout the Northwest in its 
thirty years of operation, and it restricted the employee from providing 
any services or doing work in any capacity for any of the employer’s 
“past, present or potential client[s].”
301
 
The Freiburger court declined to reform the agreement because of 
the unreasonableness of the restriction and the need for the court to 
essentially rewrite the entire covenant.
302
  The court stated that the 
covenant was “‘so lacking in the essential terms which would protect the 
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employee’ such that the trial court is no longer modifying but rewriting 
the covenant.”
303
  Although the court did not use the language of good 
faith, the holding restricted the judicial power of reformation when an 
employer in bad faith overreaches with a non-compete covenant that is 
facially overbroad and excessive. 
VII. A GOOD FAITH STANDARD FOR THE AFTERTHOUGHT AGREEMENT 
A. Our Proposed Good Faith Test 
We believe that a voluntariness requirement can be fashioned in the 
employment setting that parallels the standards for good faith under 
section 2-209 and those adopted by courts in the reformation setting—
standards that would allow good faith afterthought agreements without 
the necessity of independent consideration.  We propose a two-prong test 
for good faith in the afterthought context.  The substantive component 
would consider the business justification for the afterthought agreement, 
including changes in the employment relationship necessitating the non-
compete covenant and the extent to which the employer was seeking a 
non-compete covenant based on legitimate protectable interests in the 
protection of trade secrets or customer relationships.  The process 
component of the good faith standard would primarily focus on the 
negotiation process, including the means by which the employer secured 
the employee’s assent to the non-compete agreement. 
The substantive component of our good faith standard recognizes 
that changing business conditions and the evolution of employment 
relationship over time can justify an employer’s request for a non-
compete agreement during the course of employment.  Frequently, an 
employee working with clients or customers will gradually develop 
personal relationships with those persons—relationships that can be 
exploited and used to divert the goodwill of his or her employer if the 
employee starts a competing business or works for a direct competitor.  
Poole is an example of this common scenario.  The non-compete was 
presented to the travel agency employee three and a half years after she 
commenced employment, arguably because she had by then established 
customer relationships that could have been exploited if she competed 
with the agency.  In fact, Poole sued to recover costs associated with the 
transfer of cruise bookings with those customers, and the travel agency 
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defended itself based on the non-compete agreement she signed.  An 
employer who presents a non-compete agreement months or even years 
after employment commenced based on this change in employment 
circumstances is acting in good faith from a substantive standpoint. 
In contrast, an employer is not acting in good faith if the employer 
presents an overbroad non-compete after employment has commenced 
without a legitimate protectable interest at risk.  Maw is exemplary of 
this scenario: an overbroad non-compete presented to an employee 
simply because of a change in corporate policy that dictated a non-
compete agreement from any employee at a particular level of the 
organization.  Labriola presents a similar scenario.  There, the employee 
was already burdened by a non-compete when the employer—who was 
facing financial difficulties—presented him with a broader restrictive 
covenant for no apparent business reason.  This suggested that the actual 
purpose for the afterthought agreement was to restrict his future 
employment opportunities and potential competitive activities.  Finally, 
an afterthought agreement that is facially or substantially overbroad as in 
Summits 7 and Freiburger should trigger heightened judicial scrutiny of 
the employer’s good faith. 
Independent consideration also is an important factor in the 
substantive component of good faith but should not be determinative as it 
is under the minority rule.  Some courts following the minority approach 
allow an employer to satisfy the independent consideration requirement 
with a token consideration.
304
  Under our approach, as under section 2-
209,
305
 nominal consideration provided an employee may not be 
sufficient if other elements of bad faith are present.  On the other hand, 
when an employee receives a promotion—a bona fide advancement—
specialized training, or access to trade secrets, the substantive element of 
the good faith standard should be satisfied. 
The process component of the good faith standard would consider 
factors relevant to the cubewrap contract cases, including whether the 
employee was apprised of the required non-compete agreement before 
the commencement of the relationship and whether the employee has 
changed his or her position because of the employer’s delay in presenting 
the non-compete agreement.  Lack of notice may be suggestive of but 
does not necessarily establish bad faith, as the Merrimack Valley court 
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concluded.  In some industries and professions non-compete agreements 
are customary, and prospective employees may otherwise be aware that 
their new employers will request a standard non-compete agreement. 
Lack of notice coupled with other factors may support a finding of 
bad faith.  In Merrimack Valley, the non-compete was not discussed at 
the interview or hiring stage, and the employee was provided a pricing 
book with sensitive proprietary information without any confidentiality, 
non-solicitation, or non-compete agreement—facts that may have 
suggested to the employee that no such covenant was required.  
Similarly, a delay in presentment of a non-compete that results in an 
employee changing his position is another factor in the process element 
of good faith.  An employee who quits his job and moves his family 
before being apprised of the need for a non-compete is placed in a 
different and weakened bargaining position and may feel compelled to 
sign an agreement, the existence or terms of which the employee may 




The nature of the negotiating process is also critical to the process 
component of good faith.  Good faith assumes a voluntary modification 
of the employment relationship.  Consequently, bad faith would be 
presumed if the employer threatened discharge or engaged in other 
coercive actions to secure the consent of the employee.  Express or 
implied threats to discharge should clearly be discouraged, and cases like 
Maw involving refusals to negotiate, threats to discharge, and overbroad 
non-compete agreements present the most compelling cases of bad faith.  
As under section 2-209, however, we suggest that an employer can rebut 
this presumption for several reasons. 
First, whether an employer has “threatened” discharge is a difficult 
factual determination.  Employees may be inclined to understand that 
they must sign a non-compete or simply believe that they have to sign or 
be discharged, as in the Labriola case.  In such ambiguous cases, courts 
should consider the facts surrounding the employee’s understanding as 
part of the overall good faith analysis.  Second, even when the employee 
is presented with a sign-it-or-leave choice, other elements of good faith 
may counterbalance that pressure.  Thus, an employee presented with a 
reasonable non-compete as a condition of a promotion to a high-level, 
sensitive position in an organization may be “compelled” to accept the 
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non-compete covenant, but the good faith standard could be satisfied.  
Thus, substantial consideration in the form of a promotion or 
advancement may be sufficient to rebut the presumption of bad faith in 
these types of scenarios. 
B. Our Good Faith Test in Practice 
How would the good faith standard operate in practice?  No court 
has embraced a good faith standard, but the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
seminal decision in Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies
307
 came 
close to adopting a good faith standard.  Davies is the leading case in 
Minnesota adopting the minority rule that continuation of employment is 
not sufficient consideration for the afterthought agreement.  
Nevertheless, a careful reading of the Davies opinion reveals a more 
nuanced approach to the consideration issue, one that in both policy and 
result is in line with our proposed good faith standard. 
Davies involved a consolidated appeal in which Davies & Davies 
Agency, Inc. (the agency), an insurance agency, sought to enforce non-
compete agreements against two former employees, Richard Davies and 
Robert Buckingham.
308
  The court concluded that the afterthought 
agreement executed by Richard Davies was enforceable as modified by 
the trial court, but the afterthought agreement signed by Buckingham 
was unenforceable due to a lack of consideration.
309
  Interestingly, in 
neither case was there independent consideration. 
The Richard Davies appeal involved a bitter dispute between the 
owner of the agency, Everett Davies, and his eldest son, Richard Davies.  
Richard joined his father’s firm when he was twenty years old, initially 
doing clerical work for the firm.
310
  His father wanted one of his sons to 
succeed him in the business, and Richard was groomed for that 
succession.
311
  In 1967, four months after he began work, Richard was 
presented with a five-year non-compete agreement that precluded him 
from engaging in the insurance business within a fifty-mile radius of 
Minneapolis, St. Paul, or Duluth, Minnesota.
312
  The non-compete 
agreement was not discussed at the time of hire, and Everett allegedly 
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informed Richard that it was a mere formality.
313
  Subsequent thereto, 
Richard received extensive training and experience in probate and court 
bonds, and by 1972 was running that part of the agency’s business.
314
  
Unfortunately, Richard’s relationship with his father deteriorated over 
the years and became so strained that his father terminated him in 1978 
after discovering his intent to resign.
315
  The agency sued to enforce the 




The Davies court, in its discussion of the majority and minority rules 
on consideration, was clearly sensitive to the bargaining position of an 
employee in the afterthought context, stating: 
[A]n employee frequently has no bargaining power once he is 
employed and can easily be coerced. . . .  [I]n such cases there is a 
danger that an employer does not need protection for his investment in 
the employee but instead seeks to impose barriers to prevent an 
employee from securing a better job elsewhere.
317
 
Thus, the court recognized both the substantive and procedural issues 
with afterthought agreements, and its resolution of the case reflects the 
resolution of these two aspects of our good faith standard. 
In the Richard Davies appeal, the court found the necessary 
consideration in the leadership role, training and support Richard 
received, none of which were expressly bargained for at the time the 
contract was signed.  In essence, the court read into the employment 
relationship a commitment on the part of the agency to give Richard a 
“successor-track” position and the training and education to support his 
advancement in the agency.  In that sense, the conclusion is consistent 
with the substantive element of our proposed good faith standard 
although the breadth of the non-compete agreement in terms of time and 
scope would have triggered scrutiny under our test. 
In the Buckingham appeal, there was strong evidence of bad faith.  
Buckingham was “successfully employed” in the industry, and he 
became interested in working for the agency only because he was 
promised an ownership interest in the business.
318
  After his fallout with 
Richard, Everett promised Buckingham one percent of the business and 
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an option to acquire a controlling interest in the firm.  The parties 
executed a non-binding letter of intent to memorialize this 
understanding.
319
  Relying on the promises of a majority equity share, 
Buckingham quit his previous employment and joined the agency in 
February of 1977.
320
  Eleven days after he started work, Everett 
presented him with a non-compete agreement that Buckingham 
grudgingly signed with the proviso that his consent to the non-compete 
agreement was based on the letter of intent.
321
  Despite repeated requests 
for Everett to honor the letter of intent, the sale was never finalized.
322
  
Because of Everett’s failure to live up to his promises, Buckingham left 
the agency in June of 1978 and engaged in competitive activities within 
the scope of the non-compete agreement.
323
 
The court concluded that there was no consideration for the 
agreement that Buckingham had signed, in part because Buckingham did 
not have an opportunity to examine the restrictive covenant during the 
employment negotiations, and he was threatened with discharge if he did 
not sign it.
324
  Rather than rely exclusively on the lack of independent 
consideration, the court’s analysis of the factual context of the non-
compete agreement reflects the process element of our proposed good 
faith standard.  Although Buckingham knew that he would be required to 
sign a non-compete agreement, the facts surrounding its execution 
indicate bad faith on the part of Everett Davies.  This includes the lack of 
any true negotiation of the non-compete agreement, the delay in 
presenting the non-compete until after Buckingham quit his prior 
position and commenced employment, and the detrimental reliance and 
change in negotiating position that it caused.  The court could also have 
relied on Buckingham’s reliance on the letter of intent and Everett’s 
promise to grant Buckingham an opportunity to purchase a controlling 
interest in the business. 
The process element of the good faith determination in the Richard 
Davies matter is less clear because the facts are more ambiguous.  Unlike 
Buckingham, however, Richard was not experienced in the industry and 
fully employed.  Thus, Richard suffered no detrimental reliance, nor was 
he placed in a weakened negotiating position as a result of the timing of 
the non-compete agreement.  Moreover, the delay in presenting the non-
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compete to Richard does not appear to have been a tactical maneuver on 
his father’s part.  In fact, Everett mistakenly believed his son’s age—
twenty years old—rendered any contract with him unenforceable and did 
not require the non-compete when Richard started working for the 
agency.
325
  Finally, there does not appear to have been any coercion in 
securing Richard’s consent to the agreement through a threat to discharge 
or other bad faith, as with Everett’s promise in the Buckingham case. 
Davies provides an illustrative example of the good faith standard in 
action.  Good faith will require a court’s probing, pragmatic analysis of 
the facts and context of the afterthought agreement.  It also requires an 
analysis of the afterthought agreement from the employer’s and 
employee’s perspective, which ultimately involves the business interests 
at risk and the fairness of the negotiation process. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Our proposed good faith standard provides an equitable result when 
an afterthought agreement is truly voluntary but lacks the separate 
consideration required under the minority rule.  Also, by focusing on 
good faith rather than continued employment, our approach directly 
addresses the problem with the afterthought agreement—the potential 
use of unfair bargaining power by employers.  We believe that the 
proposed rule serves to protect employees from unfair bargaining power 
and bad faith while preserving the autonomy of employers to adapt their 
employment relationships to protect their business assets. 
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